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Editor's Notes

Our October Number was devoted to Rural Development. In this issue Drs Shama and Bhattacharya carry on the discussion with a realistic appraisal of the situation in India where, as they see it, the battle against destitution rather than institution rebuilding understandably attracts the greatest concern and while poverty persists they see the *Panchyati Raj* remaining, sadly, in the doldrums.

David Hirschmann provides a full picture of Lesotho's 'Budget Calendar', a microcism of the dificulties – largely human – that face nearly all Developing Countries as they draft their annual estimates. Despite frustrations and delays and failures, that Lesotho's Second Five Year Plan got off to a better start than the First at least provides some hope for the future. It is salutary to note how hard a new bureaucracy finds it to keep to a fairly simple timetable – a procedure which prior to independence rarely caused a major problem.

The new constitution is now in force in Nigeria; an Executive style President has now been elected. How will the Civil Service fare? Will Head of Civil Service and Secretary to the Government remain separate posts as the constitution clearly intended but did not specifically decree? on this important point, the success of the new democratic regime may well depend.

Returning to the sub-continent, Dr Umapathy examines Indian Land Tribunal and he sees in their success so far, as guardians of law and justice, as meeting a national need and doing so acceptably to the people – due principally to carefully designed structure and procedures: here is a lesson for many other similar bodies.

Finally Samir Farid looks at what he considers the failure of Nigerian Public Enterprises, and suggests how improvements can be made, placing emphasis, *inter alia*, on short and long term management training.

Changing Strategies of Rural Development in India

SUDESH K SHARMA & MOHIT BHATTACHARYA*

The latest Census of 1971 reported a 438.8 million rural population in India, constituting 80% of her total population. With most of her people living in rural areas and the economy being heavily dependent on agriculture and allied operations, India has justifiable concern for speedy rural development. Development of the rural areas is necessary to support the industrial structure and to increase foodgrains production. As a recent Committee report[1] revealed, nearly 19 million people fall in the unemployed category for whom jobs have to be created in the rural areas. The real battle against poverty has to be fought in the countryside and rural poverty can be slowly but steadily removed only by a sustained rural development programme.

Changing Strategies:

The strategy of rural development has shifted gradually from macro concerns to micro or area based and clientèle – specific development. In 1952 started the Community Development Movement which was very general in scope and not specifically production orientated. As an officially sponsored and government administered programme, the CD movement had its internal contradictions which had to be resolved by the introduction of popularly elected *panchayati raj* institutions in 1957. The grim food situation in the subsequent years triggered a search for directly production orientated programmes.

This led to the formulation in the early sixties of a number of programmes such as The Intensive Agricultural District Programme and The Intensive Agricultural Area Programme which were designed to accelerate agricultural production in selected regions that were naturally endowed with good soil and irrigation facilities. With more and better inputs, and greater intensity of extensive work, faster growth was actually achieved in these areas. The efforts to augment production were helped fortuitously by the availability of Mexican high-yielding variety seeds. The cumulative result of all these efforts was the phenomenon which came to be characterized as the 'Green Revolution'. In the seventies, the emphasis shifted to the target group approach. It was sought to balance the productivity movement by an egalitarian concern. A number of clientèle-specific programmes were launched to improve the economic conditions of small and marginal-area farmers and the

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[1] *Report of the Study Team on Rural Employment*, Government of India, 1975, p 24.

landless agricultural labourers. Special programmes were conceived for the 38 million tribal population who had virtually been left out of the development process earlier. In 1974, another special programme was launched for the development of the chronically drought affected areas. If the earlier programmes were meant for the poorer 'people', the drought prone areas programme was meant for the poorer 'areas' – the marginal landscape representing the arid and semi-arid areas where living has traditionally been difficult for man, for beast and for crops.

In addition, a variety of special programmes have been launched in recent years to deal with specific areas and problems such as hill areas, desert areas, rural industries, rural artisans, rural employment, etc. Besides, projects have been specially formulated to develop specific crops like sugar cane, cotton and pulses. In the field of animal husbandry also there have been a number of schemes for the development of cattle and dairy farming, sheep farming and wool production and so on.

Looking back one can therefore sum up that the tendency in recent years has been to concentrate on *specific* problems and try to deal with them directly. This has produced some good results because of concentrated attention and pointed trust in planning and implementation. But at the same time, the specificity approach has led a process of sub-optimization in rural development. This has spawned multiplication of programmes, projects and agencies, each of which has tended to become a world unto itself. At the field level, activities in any sector generally have repercussion on other allied sectors. Physically also, projects have geographical spill-over effects. Hence, vital linkages need to be established between programmes and projects and their areas of operation, in order to gain a maximum pay-off from capital investments.

Integrated Rural Development:

To remedy the ills of fragmentation, currently what is being talked about, rather vaguely though, is a new strategy of integrated rural development (IRD). IRD seeks to subsume four basic concerns of rural development in contemporary India: (i) productivity increase, (ii) removal of destitution and unemployment; (iii) local resource-based development; and (iv) popular participation. The concept of 'development' in IRD is much more comprehensive than hitherto, embracing economic, social and infrastructural development. The strategy has been spelt out as "integrated development of the area and the people through optimum development and utilization (and conservation where necessary) of local resources – physical, biological and human, and by bringing about necessary institutional, structural and attitudinal changes and by delivering a package of services to encompass not only the economic field, ie agriculture and rural industries, but also the establishment of the required social infrastructure and services in the area of health and nutrition, sanitation, housing, drinking water and literacy with the ultimate objective of improving the quality of life of the 'rural poor' and the 'rural weak'. IRD implies financial, spatial and temporal integration of all these parameters. Thus, IRD is a multifacet framework involving a multi-disciplinary approach. In this process, self-help and community participation have a paramount role".[2]

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[2]R N Azad, 'Integrated Rural Development' in S K Sharma (ed), *Dynamics of Development*, Vol 11, Concept Publishing Company, Delhi, 1977.

Rural development is an extremely complex enterprise and for a vast country like India it is difficult to apply uniform strategies and programmes for all the areas. IRD tries to bring in a synergistic approach aiming at total development of the area and the people by introducing necessary institutional and attitudinal changes and as outlined above, delivering a package of services to encompass not only the economic field, but also covering a variety of social needs in the area of health and nutrition, education and literacy, basic civic amenities, family planning, etc. It is a strategy to improve the economic and social life of the rural poor and the rural weak in the overall spectrum of development and growth. The objective is not only to raise agricultural productivity and the rate of overall economic growth in the rural areas, but also to ensure that the poor and weaker sections of the community share the benefits. The overall concern is for community orientation, appropriate state intervention, mass participation, self-reliance, pooling of local resources and services to the people.

Integration is, of course, good: but for whom? Such a comprehensive programme and perspective implicitly assumes a commonality of interest among the rural populance. Because of vast differences in the basic possession of individuals and groups and the varying political influence of various rural groups, the benefits of development can rarely be equated. The fundamental problem is that of the socio-economic milieu in which the institutions and organizations for rural development function and grow. The new strategy does not spell out measures for bringing about greater equality in the distribution of income and wealth and the provision of social services. This package programme needs the support of a new political will committed to equity goals and conflict minimization.

Organizational Support System:

The strategy of integrated rural development has to be matched by the strategy of an organizational support system. Over the years, the formulation of *ad hoc* schemes has led to the creation of an organizational maze in rural areas. Every scheme has a built-in organizational prescription. Lured by the bait of central financial aid, the state governments thoughtlessly fell for numerous schemes. Consequently the rural scene today presents a crazy quilt pattern with the traditional field machinery co-existing aimlessly with a variety of newly floated organizations and the often moribund *panchayati raj* institutions. Of crucial importance, at this juncture are the recommendations of two official reports – the Dantwala Committee Report on Block Planning and the Asoka Mehta Committee Report on *Panchayati Raj* Institutions. The Dantwala Committee[3] primarily concentrated on the mechanics of block planning in support of IRD.

The committee identified the following critical functions in support of decentralized planning at the block level:

i preparation of local resources inventory;
ii analysis of prevailing levels of development and identification of potential for further development and constraints in development;
iii formulation of programmes and projects and establishment of their spatial and temporal linkages;
iv local manpower planning for fuller utilization of human resources;

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[3] *Report of the Working Group on Block Level Planning*, Planning Commission, Government of India, 178.

v preparation of an inventory of funds available from various sources such as district budgets, institutional sources and the private sector;

vi monitoring and evaluation of plans and projects and their modifications in the light of feedback data.

It may be pointed out that the Committee has not favoured a block planning exercise from the block level itself. The planning function for the blocks in the district will be undertaken by a peripatetic planning team located at the district level under the overall supervision of the District Collector. Recommendations have been made to equip the planning cell with an interdisciplinary team of experts so that necessary planning skills would be specially inducted to execute the technical planning exercise.

It seems the committee has further extended the bureaucratic-technical hold over local planning which has been the trend all these years. One of the chief causes of emaciation of *panchayati raj* has been the rise of competitive bureaucratic organizations which, together, have sought to preempt the planning and developmental role of *panchayati raj*. Rural development, under the circumstances, has been continually foisted from above. The villagers have been treated as passive beneficiaries and not active participants in the development process. When the entire nation is exploring possibilities of making the best use of the locked-up energy of the vast pool of human resources, the Dantwala Committee has almost bypassed this vital issue and reinforced instead the traditional bureaucratic-technocratic way of managing rural development.

The Dantwala Committee's reservation about *panchayati raj* institutions is evident in the following observation:

'Our (second) reservation about the role of the Panchayati Raj institutions in the formulation of micro level plans arises from a widely shared view that the weaker sections of the rural community do not feel that their interests will be fully protected under the *Panchayati Raj* institutions. A stronger version of this feeling is that the leadership of the Panchayati Raj institutions acts as a 'gate-keeper' and prevents the flow of benefits for the weaker sections of the rural community. This is hardly surprising in the given context of the inegalitarian structure of the rural economy. Unless and until adequate safeguards are provided against the likelihood of the dominance of the *Panchayati Raj* institutions by vested interests, giving them a decisive voice in the preparation of micro level or grass-root plans, one of its major objectives, namely, removal of poverty, exploitation and unemployment will not have much chance of being realized.'

The committee has obviously been concerned with the technical purity of planning and has sought to insulate it from the rough and tumble of the rural political process. That planning itself stems from the political will and needs for its sustenance and implementation continued political back stopping was, however, overlooked by the Committee.

The rural political scenario has not remained static in India since the inception of *Panchayati Raj* in the later part of the fifties. Competition among political parties to win over the rural electorate has led to increasing politicization of the masses. In many places,

new leadership patterns are emerging which are change-orientated. Radicalization of the peasantry has been taking place in the wake of land reform measures. This political context has to be reckoned with in any restructuring of rural institutions and organizations.

The earlier committee on Block Planning was supposed to thrash out the technicalities of micro-level planning, while the Asoka Mehta Committee was to suggest the basic institutional framework for rural planning and development. It was injudicious to constitute two committees in the same or closely allied areas. Planning cannot take place in an organizational vacuum. The basic problem is to design an appropriate organization which will undertake planning and development.

Asoka Mehta Committee[4]

The Mehta Committee was set up in December 1977 to inquire into the working of the *Panchayati Raj* institutions, and to suggest measures to strengthen them, so as to enable a decentralized system of planning and development to be effective. It seems both '*Panchayati Raj*' and 'decentralized planning and development' were accepted as given. All that the Committee has had to do is to relegitimize an old system which is on the verge of collapse. The Mehta Committee has identified various reasons for the weakening of *Panchayati Raj* system over the years, more important among which are disassociation of the growing and complex developmental programmes from these institutions, inability of the bureaucracy to execute the programmes through elected bodies, lack of political will to foster these institutions, structural deficiencies in the system, and ambiguity about the concept and meaning of *panchayati raj*. Structural changes have been advocated at two levels: the district and the *Mandal*. Almost on the model of Maharashtra *Zilla Parishad*,* the district has been accepted as the first point of decentralization under popular supervision. The *Zilla Parishad* will consist of directly elected and nominated elements. With a district legislature, a district cabinet and a district bureaucracy headed by a chief executive officer, development administration will be managed by a set-up that has the making of State Government at the district level. Rural-urban integration has been sought through the representation of municipalities on the *zilla parishad*. Regulatory administration including law and order and revenue matters will continue to be in the charge of the District Collector.

The second tier called the Mandal Panchayat in the two-tier system recommended by the Committee, marks an institutional innovation. To quote the Committee, 'Below the district level, the balance between technological requirements and possibilities for meaningful participaton by the people in development management can . . . be best achieved, by grouping a number of villages to constitute Mandal Panchayats'. The Mandal Panchayats are proposed to be set up below the present development blocks with direct representation and functional representation. Each one of these bodies is to cover a population of 15,000 to 20,000.

The Committee has also suggested sources of funds for the Panchayati Raj institutions and recommended their proper staffing to make sure that they have requisite personnel to run

[4] *Report of the Committee on Panchayati Raj institutions*, Government of India, 1978.

*When first established the Panchayati Raj system was in 3 tiers: Gram Panchayats at village level, Panchayat Samiti at Block level and Zilla Parishads at District level.

the administration. Considering the diversity of the country and the history and peculiarities of different regions, the Committee has left room for adaptation of the two-tier model to fit local circumstances.

Whither Rural Development

The Asoka Mehta Committee has said little that is really new. It has merely re-emphasized the need for 'institutionalization' of *panchayati raj*. If the conditions that led to the gradual weakening of these bodies continue to exist, what is the future of *panchayati raj*? 'Democratic decentralization' was a catchy slogan in the fifties when Nehru reigned supreme. In contemporary India the growing concern is more for the removal of destitution than for institution rebuilding just for the sake of rebuilding. The Dantwala Committee captured the current mood when it observed: 'If we wish to plan for the weak, the plan may have to be imposed from above and cannot be a product from below in which the below is dominated by the rich and the strong'. For a country that has just emerged out of the shadows of a threatening authoritarianism, democratic values have assumed added significance no doubt. But so long as poverty persists on a substantially large scale, the democratic edifice will continue to have an insecure foundation. Rural development can brook no delay, but the institutions and organizations to support it still seem sadly to remain in the doldrums.

The Budget Calendar in Lesotho

DAVID HIRSCHMANN*

Background

Lesotho, a very small, underdeveloped and dependent country, was granted political independence in 1966. A year later a Central Planning and Development Office (CPDO) was established. Starting with only three professional officers, all expatriates, the Office has over the years increased in size and output, and Planning Units have been set up in most of the more important Ministries. The changes which have occurred in the planning machinery have generally been incremental rather than innovative and (as will become clear from this article) serious obstacles remain in the way of efficient management of planning.[1]

From the start, the interrelated tasks of preparing the capital budget and formulation of project memoranda have been the principal on-going tasks of Lesotho's planners. In the first part of the article, these two tasks will be observed for the period of one financial year 1975–76. Another major responsibility has been the preparation of medium-term plans. In Part II the preparation of Lesotho's second five-year plan will be discussed.

Part 1: The Budget Calendar

Introduction

Observation of the operation of the budget calendar (and more particularly the capital budget and project memoranda components thereof) was judged a useful exercise for a number of reasons.

First, the tasks of preparing and monitoring capital budgets and project memoranda are amongst the most important and time-consuming of those executed by Lesotho's planning machinery. In the absence of an annual plan the budget assumes added significance.

Second, the budget process was examined with the purpose of observing the link between

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[1]For a discussion of the first decade of planning in Lesotho see D. Hirschmann, 'Administration of Planning in Lesotho: the Second Leg', *Development and Change*, Vol 9, No 1, 1978, pp 397–414.

timely formulation and timely implementation of development programmes. Absorptive capacity depends on expeditious drafting and execution of projects. In Lesotho, utilization of what was the largest foreign component of the capital programme (namely the British) depended expressly on completion of undertakings, or phases thereof, within the specified time of one financial year, 1 April to 31 March. Year after year, many projects were approved so late in the financial year that their implementation was impossible. In earlier years this meant that substantial amounts of British aid was lost to Lesotho. In the early 1970s the British became more flexible about their programme, and the Lesotho planners more adept at substituting fast-moving projects for slow-moving ones. The grant thus came to be fully utilized. This meant, however, that the programme as implemented diverged from that planned, while the spate of late approvals and changes impeded construction programming by the Ministry of Works. The CPDO's continual attempts to expedite the process and set deadlines had consistently met with indifferent reaction from Ministries. Thus it was intended to see at what stages and to what extent the budget exercise fell behind schedule.

Third, attention was directed towards the budget cycle by an unresolved conflict of opinion about the process of release of funds by the Budget Office. The Ministry of Works had for several years attracted severe condemnation for its sluggish execution of construction jobs. Works, in turn, felt that much of the blame should be attached to various failings in the rest of Government service, one of which was the considerable delay experienced in securing the release of funds necessary to carry out its responsibilities. One official complained that 'an enormous amount of time' of a number of senior officers 'is wasted . . . trying to find out why we haven't got cash and trying to get cash released'. The Budget Division denied that delays were serious when ministries followed the correct procedures: 'There are procedures for obtaining release of funds. Any ministry can obtain funds for projects that have been passed under the correct heads'. Works contested this: 'It is just not so for Finance to say that ministries can get release of funds within one day . . . I have personally gone up there and waited two days and come away with nothing — and I cannot fathom the delay'. Ledgers were displayed which clearly showed that projects had operated in the red for a whole year, the release of funds coming through on the last day of the year. While this had been done in previous years 'just to keep things going', it was no longer feasible, since the Government had made clear its intention to surcharge individuals responsible for overexpenditure. A number of specific problems raised by officers in various ministries were followed up, but no general conclusions could be drawn from these cases. It was decided therefore to broaden the scope to include that of the budget process as a whole.

Finally, this examination was considered of interest because the Government had recently formalized a comprehensive budget calendar. In July 1972, an ECA adviser led a budget-plan harmonization workshop in Maseru. Arising out of its deliberations, in which most senior civil servants participated, came a proposal for a synchronized timetable for preparing the recurrent and capital estimates, after which a detailed schedule was drafted.[2]

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[2]Budget/plan harmonization workshop, 12–28 July 1972, *Suggestions for budgetary reform and improvement of budget/plan harmonization*, Annexure A, Maseru, 1972.

According to the ECA adviser, the stipulation that 'certain things to be done by certain times' was intended to overcome many of the impediments to effective and punctual budgeting: 'getting things done at the right time is critical'. In 1973, after further consultation, the Calendar was included in a guidebook on budgetary practices which had recommedatory status only.[3] In March 1974 the Cabinet directed that the book be adopted as an official manual, and it was issued later that year.[4] The Government intended, through integrating the two budgetary processes, to tighten financial control, to improve the cost-effectiveness, and to strengthen the developmental component of its expenditure programmes. It was thought useful, therefore, to observe the process in practice and record some views on the operation of the Calendar.

Observation and Comment

The Budget Calendar (see Appendix for full Calendar) lists twenty-one steps (which, when subdivided, total thirty-five steps) which should be taken during the financial year. One may distinguish two cycles operating in parallel:

a the *'implementation' cycle*, concerned with monitoring and reviewing the implementation of the programme, and its constituent projects which should have been prepared in the previous year – this includes four joint reviews by the Budget-Planning Working Group (made up of officers in the Budget and Planning Offices) and their consideration by the Budget and Development Planning Committee (a high-level committee under the Chairmanship of the Senior Permanent Secretary); and

b the simultaneously-operating *'formulation' cycle*, covering the preparation of the estimates and projects for the year thereafter – this includes projections of the next year's resources, sectoral allocations for expenditure, deadlines for ministries to prepare submissions, dates for various meetings to consider these matters and Cabinet and Parliamentary approval.

In addition to observing the various steps involved, detailed interviews based on the Calendar were carried out with personnel of the CPDO, the Budget Office, various ministries, and, on a few particular aspects, with members of the British High Commission. Some of the more important points emerging from this investigation (including the interviews) follow:

i *Economic Survey*

There was no systematic survey of the state of the economy, nor was there a full examination of the previous year's performance by the ministries, nor did they provide cost information on their operations. A control base was therefore lacking for analysis and comparison of the cost-effectiveness of programmes on the basis of which those responsible for managing funds could draw conclusions, interpret those conclusions and then 'put forward options' for future undertakings and 'suggest which options to follow'. In 1974 there was a survey of physical progress on the first four years of the First Plan, but this was undertaken specifically with preparation of the Second Plan in mind.

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[3]Government of Lesotho, *Guidelines of budgetary practices of the Government of Lesotho*, Maseru, 1973.
[4]Government of Lesotho, *Manual of budgetary procedures*, Maseru, 1974.

ii *Call Circular*

The Calendar stipulates that a call circular be issued on 21 June, requiring ministries to return their detailed draft estimates by 31 August (giving them approximately ten weeks). This was done on 29 July (about five weeks late, but earlier than in the previous year) and the deadlines were set at 30 September (for capital estimates) and 15 October (for recurrent estimates).[5] A hitch which was noticed here was that the headquarters of certain ministries retained these circulars for an unnecessarily long time before forwarding them to the divisions. In the Ministry of Works, for example, the circulars remained at the centre for six weeks and were sent only on 9 September; thus instead of having aproximately nine weeks for the capital estimates and eleven weeks for the recurrent, the divisions had only three and five weeks respectively.

Those questioned seemed agreed that the period allotted of two or two-and-a-half months would be sufficient if documents were forwarded punctually and if the departments attended to them promptly. One person commented that it did not seem to matter how early the call circular was sent out as most departments 'only start reacting about the last day when you start ringing them'.

iii *Submission Deadlines*

The deadlines for these submissions were, as stated above, 30 September and 15 October. The list below indicates (a) the names of ministries, (b) dates of their submissions, (c) number of days overdue on capital estimates, and (d) number of days late on recurrent estimates:

Ministry	*Submission Date*	*Recurrent Estimates — days overdue*	*Capital Estimates — days overdue*
Agriculture	9/1/75	86	101
Health	15/11/74	31	46
Education	6/11/74	22	37
Finance	23/10/74	8	23
Commerce & Industry	23/10/74	8	23
Justice	10/1/75	87	102
Interior	6/1/75	83	98
PM's Office	11/11/74	27	42
Minister to the PM	19/11/74	35	50
Defence	30/10/74	15	30
Foreign	10/1/75	87	102
Works	18/11/74	34	49
Communications	8/11/74	24	39[6]

[5] *Circular Savingram*, Finance to Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Departments, FIN/EXPDT/S.1 (75/76)–2, 29/7/74.

[6] *Finance Circular Notice*, No 1 of 1975, FIN/EXPDT/S.1 (75/76)–8, Vol 1, 14/1/75.

The submissions of some ministries, including the largest, Agriculture, were about three months late. Most were four to six weeks late. This delay should be added to the five weeks already lost through the late despatch of the Call Circular. Overall this was a poor response and, in addition, the content of a number of these submissions required considerable reworking.

iv *British Programme*

In accordance with an agreement between the two Governments, Lesotho was required to despatch approved estimates to Britain before the end of December. Since Agreements with donors are regarded as more obligatory than local instructions, the necessary documentation was sent off in time. However, it was far from final since (as shown above) many of the ministries' estimates were not yet submitted; nor was it formally approved as the Budget and Development Planning Committee and the Cabinet did not see it until February and March.

Approvals of projects for implementation were delayed by a misunderstanding in the previous year. Lesotho's request exceeded the amount allocated by Britain, and consequently the British did not consider it a final document and did not attend to it. After a few months' delay urgent messages were sent from Lesotho and the matter was cleared up. This hold-up postponed approval of the whole programme and of projects, so delaying execution in the year under observation. While everyone agreed that such an error would not recur – and it did not, in the formulation year under study – its occurrence indicated weak management by both the CPDO and the Budget and Development Committee, either of which should have spotted it earlier.

v *Progress Reports (British)*

Another more specific example of a setback to implementation concerned the failure of a division of a ministry to submit brief progress reports on two continuing projects to the British High Commission. Four-and-a-half months after the start of the financial year – no money having been released to carry on with the undertaking – the division informally enquired about this and was informed by the High Commission that it was awaiting progress reports before approving continuation. The division sent reports to the CPDO on 19 August, and the CPDO forwarded them only on 18 September (an unnecessary delay in the circumstances). According to a senior person with considerable experience in the division concerned, progress reports had never been required before. An officer of similar experience in another ministry confirmed this, and said he had heard of it purely by chance. The High Commission, however, assured me that this was an established procedure, though occasionally projects may have slipped through. Britain approves annual segments of projects, and for a project which continues into a second year it requires a brief document stating how much has been spent and accomplished in the previous year and will be needed for the next year. The CPDO, for its part, acknowledged that it was a recognized procedure, but said that it had not been comprehensively enforced by the British. The Office contended that the breakdown took place in the headquarters of the ministries because it had formally reminded them of the need to submit reports.

Because of this particular incident, everyone agreed that the fault would not be repeated. However, there continued to be a great deal of uncertainty about the required contents of

the report. The documents sent by a division in Agriculture to satisfy the British requirement were project memoranda, which are far longer and more detailed than are necessary; while Works sent both project memoranda and progress reports for this purpose: 'This is probably a waste of time', the sender admitted, 'but I was just making doubly sure'. It seemed necessary that the short list of British requirements for these reports should be clearly defined so as to encourage the ministries to submit them early.

vi *Final Accounts*

A further obstacle to the timely and satisfactory fulfilment of a number of steps in the Calendar was the extraordinary delay in the closing of the Government's final accounts. This should be done, ideally, on 31 March of the previous year, but in the year under examination ministries had to function for most of the year without knowing their exact expenditure for the previous twelve months. This obfuscates the information base for projections of capital and recurrent revenues and expenditures, hinders examination of costs and discourages early expenditure on projects.

With capital estimates there are many projects which run for more than one year. Now one can only keep within the financial limits of year two if you knew what you spent in year one. Every department should know from its own ledgers how much it has spent – but it is not as simple, as there are many red herrings which have to be finalized, eg shipping charges which have not arrived, book charges from other departments which filter through to the Treasury . . . It is very difficult to call for this year's money for an ongoing project when you don't know how much you spent the previous year.

The accounts have not been closed. If you don't know exactly what you have spent you don't know what funds you have for the year and how inflation is affecting costs in your branch. Crown Agents' returns can be very late, also [there are delays] from the districts on road projects. This would make item 2 on the Calendar [examination of performance and cost information] impossible. It can inhibit implementation as departments don't know if they should ask for money, particularly if they are verging on overexpenditure – which they should be.

vii *Reviews*

The Calendar includes four quarterly reviews of the capital programme: April, July-August, October and January. While it was agreed that the April review was an important exercise, since the programme sent to the British was by then four months out of date, it was conceded that – for the time being at least – the administration was incapable of introducing it. Thus the first review was held at the time of the second one as listed in the Calendar, and three reviews were carried out during the year instead of four. Most of those questioned felt that this was a satisfactory performance, and that the improvement was due to the more effective functioning of the Budget-Planning Working Group, the more regular meetings of the Budget and Development Planning Committee to consider 'the spade-work' prepared by the Working Group, and the timing of the visits of British advisers (from the Southern Africa Development Division in Blantyre, Malawi) to coincide with the reviews:

We attempt to make visits by our experts coincide with the reviews here of the British programme. This is improving. The reviews plus the presence of our experts means Lesotho has to take a much more regular look at outturn and forces them to apply the standards of our advisers. It means they know where they are and it is much easier to switch funds in mid-year.

viii *Stock of projects*

The Budget Calendar does not set a deadline for the submission of project memoranda but merely states, in parenthesis, early on in the year: 'Formulation of capital projects for stock continues throughout the year'. In most ministries this did not occur and the concept of building up a stock of projects was not accepted by all those responsible for preparing the memoranda. One senior officer was positive about it. In his division, the projects all tended to be large-scale ones involving engineering studies and thus it took years to prepare a stock. Memoranda based on engineering studies provided the sort of information that any donor would require: 'What the German consultants will give us will be what all potential donors will want'. On the other hand, an experienced member of a Planning Unit which prepared both large and small projects, disagreed strongly:

> I will not prepare projects for a stock. I will not spend hours and hours with this rubbish. Only when I have a pretty sure idea of the donor will I prepare a project. I do write memos up during the year, but with a donor in mind . . . Different donors have different requirements, need different emphases, different information and over time you get to know this.

ix *Deadline for Projects*

There did appear to be agreement, however, that a deadline should be set for the submission of those projects to be included in the British programme. This would give the CPDO and the Budget Division sufficient time to study the documents; and also the High Commission, and the British mission in Blantyre time to peruse and approve them before the start of the implementation year. A check on the list of projects passing through the High Commission in 1974–5 indicated that projects spent a minimum of one and a maximum of thirty-eight days at the High Commission, while a minimum of twenty and a maximum of 214 days was required before approval was received from Blantyre. The lengthier periods were caused by queries being sent back and further investigations and delays. For projects giving rise to no serious problems, it would appear that the High Commision needed no more than ten to fourteen days and Blantyre thirty to forty. Since many projects do raise queries, an extra thirty days should be added making a total of about eighty days allowable. Thus to have memoranda approved by the beginning of the new financial year, the CPDO should be able to send them to the High Commission by 10 January. The Government should aim to accomplish this in a way which relates them to the annual programme as a whole (instead of being prepared long after); and enables the demands on the recurrent budget (arising from new development projects) to be considered at the same time, and thus to compete with steadily burgeoning administrative demands. This would require a further sixty days, placing a sensible project deadline somewhere about 10 November. Having projects arrive at this early stage would add greatly to the meaning of the capital budget, which as it stood was little more than a contents sheet of projects at every possible phase of preparation and negotiation. One adviser said:

> When I came here I thought the budget meant something. Then I found it means nothing. They budget for a capital development of R12 m., and on investigation I find they are going to spend between R5 m. and R8 m. They haven't yet got the donors nor the project memorandum. For example. Civil Aviation put up a project. Now in November [eight months into the year] Britain asks which airfields are to be improved and Civil Aviation is going off to find out which ones and what they need. So the 'red book' is meaningless.

Irrespective of British acceptance of their programme as a whole, no money can be released by Finance for implementation of British-assisted schemes until the British have approved the individual project memoranda. This particular point was not fully appreciated in all ministries.

x *Dates of Approval*

The effect on the implementation year under observation of the tardy returns of memoranda in the previous formulation year, are clear from the following list showing how many projects were approved during each month of the year. (Note that ideally all projects should be approved before April in order that there be twelve months to undertake them; each month after that reduces the time available):

April	(Month 1)	:	1
May	(Month 2)	:	0
June	(Month 3)	:	10
July	(Month 4)	:	6
August	(Month 5)	:	15
September	(Month 6)	:	9
October	(Month 7)	:	2
November	(Month 8)	:	13
December	(Month 9)	:	6
January	(Month 10)	:	3
February	(Month 11)	:	6
March	(Month 12)	:	2

In addition, eight memoranda included in the original programme did not arrive at all (although the British were informed that most of these were being held back); and seven more did come in but were too late to be approved.

xi *Project Submissions*

On the basis of the points raised in (x) above, CPDO attempted to introduce a deadline at 30 November for project memoranda and progress reports in the formulation year under observation. The circular warned that if ministries did not respond by then the Planning Office could not guarantee that their projects would be included and that a delay would lead inevitably to late release of funds. 'It is no good blaming the Central Planning Office and the Budget Division for the stop-go implementation which results from delays in submission'.[7] Additional incentive for early submission was provided by British officials agreeing to study documents arriving early in the formulation year. This would increase the possibility of their being approved by the start of the next year. Only one division of one Ministry, namely Livestock, expressly tried to take advantage of the British offer, while only two Ministries, Work and Education, reacted positively to the deadline. Thus for the first time the Planning Office was able to forward what one British official described as 'large lumps of logical submissions' in the first half of January. Monthly checks with the CPDO revealed, however, that after the promising start by a few ministries, submissions slowed to a trickle. On 1 April 1975 (that is, the first day of the implementation year, by which time all projects should ideally have been approved) only sixteen documents of the required fifty-seven (project memoranda or progress reports) had arrived at the High Commission, and not one project had yet received British approval to go ahead.

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[7] *Circular Savingram*, CPDO to Permanent Secretaries, CPO/36/05, 24/10/74.

Part 2: Notes on the Preparation of the Second Plan

Schedules and Responses

Preparation of the Second Plan formally commenced in May 1974 with a CPDO circular calling on ministries to submit their material for consideration and later inclusion in the Plan. Starting on 1 June the Planning Office's original work schedule allowed for approximately forty-two weeks (till the end of March 1975) to have the documentation finalized and sent off to the printers. The key dates on this schedule were:

Week 13 (31 August):	Ministries' submissions into CPDO
Week 19 (15 October):	CPDO appraisal of these submissions complete
Week 21 (31 October):	Discussions with the ministries complete
Week 26 (30 November):	Drafting and typing complete
Week 30 (31 December):	Cabinet consideration complete
Week 38 (28 February):	Further negotiations with ministries complete
Week 42 (31 March):	Retyping and collating complete and documents sent to printers.

Not one department or ministry complied with the first deadline of 31 August for submissions of their general draft plan material and 'thumbnail sketches' of projects. In the middle of December (three-and-a-half months after the deadline) the following was the position on submissions:

	Dates of submissions	
Ministry	*General material*	*Thumbnail sketches*
Agriculture, Marketing, Cooperatives	Not in yet	Not in yet
Community Development	15 November	Not in yet
Education	5 September	5 September
Cabinet Office		
Broadcasting and Information	25 November	25 November
Public Service Buildings	8 November	8 November
Police	18 November	18 November
Prisons	8 November	8 November
Justice	4 November	4 November
Interior	18 November	Not in yet
Works		
Roads	12 September	10 September
Water and sewerage	12 September	10 September
Hydrology	12 September	10 September
Mechanical Workshop	12 September	10 September

Communications		
Postal development	1 November	1 November
Civil Aviation	4 November	4 November
Telecommunications	15 November	15 November
Lesotho Airways	11 November	11 November
Lesotho Electricity Corp	9 September	9 September
Government Printer	2 December	2 December
Lands, Surveys & Planning	16 September	12 November
Commerce & Industry	October	4 November
Mines	October	4 November
Tourism	October	4 November
LNDC	26 November	4 November
Labour	October	4 November

Thus, of the Ministries, only Works and Education had responded promptly. Works' submissions were very satisfactory and the CPDO was able to proceed with them. Education's were not, and it took many months of redrafting by the Ministry and the CPDO to improve them. Most seriously, Agriculture had not submitted anything, while most other ministries were about ten to twelve weeks late. Furthermore, the standard of many of the documents required far more attention and time than had been anticipated and the eight weeks scheduled for appraisal and discussion proved to be far from sufficient. Communications was an exception for, although late, the CPDO found its material of a standard which permitted it to proceed quickly to an advanced stage of drafting.

In December the Planning Office extended its planned schedule by about four weeks until the end of April 1975. This slight increase was unrealistic in that it was clear that most departments (and this excludes Works, Communications, Mines and Statistics) were already anywhere between twelve and eighteen weeks behind.

At the beginning of each month from November 1974 to June 1975, planning officers were asked for a brief report on progress in the sectors for which they were responsible. The outstanding feature was the change in the section dealing with Agriculture, where the initial optimism turned steadily to disappointment. For example, the following were brief monthly comments on the Crops Division:

November:	Nothing has come in.
December:	They have one or two big projects, and for the rest it's ideas only.
January:	A meeting has been held to discuss their situation.
February:	Their submission is poor.
March:	Their submission is '100% inadequate'.
April:	CPDO decided to work on it as the division is clearly not capable.
May:	No more progress because of the Donor Conference in April.
June:	CPDO completed a draft; delayed by a typing bottleneck and the absence of the Senior Planning Officer; has just been returned to Agriculture for comments.

The record for the Cooperatives Division reads:

November:	A weak submission.
December:	The situation is chaotic.
January:	No further material – the position is 'very shaky'.
February:	Their submission is being delayed so as to relate it better to the material which will be prepared in Crops.
March:	There has been no advance but they have promised to work on it.
April:	Still no progress.
May:	No progress because time devoted to the Donor Conference.
June:	Somebody drew up a submission after being in the country a few weeks. No one takes it seriously and there is no one to work on it.

In contrast the section dealing with Works and Communications progressed punctually through the phases of negotiation, re-drafting and re-negotiation, and by April had pre-final drafts ready. It delayed finalizing documents because other ministries were still far behind, and meetings to polish and edit went on for a considerable time.

In the case of Commerce and Industry, there arose possibly the largest divergence between the Planning Office and a ministry on policy and evaluation of capacity. In consequence, monthly reports recorded that drafts were being prepared by one or other party for reconsideration, and ultimately a compromise couched in relatively generalized terms was reached, with which neither was perfectly happy. Given that there was no body to arbitrate, this was a reasonably satisfactory solution.

The first document arrived from Education promptly, but the material was considered to be very raw. Discussions and re-drafting by both the Ministry and the Planning Office over a lengthy period brought the Education section of the Plan to a relatively advanced stage (which still required further financial analysis) by June. With Health, even more so than with Education, the CPDO was required to take a large share of the workload, with the process dragging on until June when a draft, including Health's latest comments, was being prepared.

Justice and Interior both produced weak submissions, and for month after month one saw little response from these Ministries. Many of their proposals concerned buildings which were prepared by the Cabinet Planning Unit, and these two Ministries were considered to almost totally lack direction or policy or plans for the training of personnel.
Taking all the sectors into account, the CPDO was quite unable to keep up with its timetable, and the final tying together of all the threads dragged on for months. The Plan was finally issued in June 1976 instead of June 1975.

Discussion

i *Late start*

From the outset it was clear that Lesotho's planners had left the start of the exercise too late, and in consequence had allowed themselves too little time. As the staffing position of the office had been strengthened only in April 1974, they probably could not have begun much

earlier than they did. Yet a senior member of the CPDO admitted that the 'time factor' had been 'neglected'. As a result they allowed the ministries only twelve weeks to prepare their first submissions which was regarded by many as too short a period.

That is unrealistic. We were not given enough time to think about it. We hadn't thought about the First Plan's achievements yet. And now we were immediately plunged into the Second Plan.
The CPDO hasn't the faintest idea of how long this takes to put together. They didn't give us enough time.

ii *Lack of guidance*

At this early stage, moreover, ministries felt that the Office should have provided a great deal more meaningful guidance about the intended content of the Plan and its direction of development.

They gave us some guidance about format but not about substance – nothing about what the CPO would like to see in the Plan – that is a wicked evasion of responsibility.

At the first meeting [the CPDO] told us to write something – as much as possible – that is all the guidance we got from them. The fact that there is no guidance in the beginning is very annoying.

A third person said that the CPDO approach of 'the sky is the limit' is 'eyewash not policy. We did not get guiding parameters. Nor do we know where to put things [locate prospects]'.

iii *Overestimation of plan preparedness*

The fact that Works was able to submit satisfactory documents within two weeks of the deadline indicates that both the above complaints were as much a reflection on the planning preparedness of many of the ministries, as on the adequacy of the twelve week period or the guidance of the Planning Office. Clearly, the CPDO erred in overestimating the material and information available for ready use by departments, as well as their capacity to use it. For example, one planner felt (at an early stage) that the medium-term co-operative programmes being worked out with donors would form 'perhaps the bulk of the first two years' and therefore that they had a 'good headstart . . . We'll have projects identified in many sectors for five to ten years'. Another confirmed this:

The project content of the next five year plan in many sectors is pretty well worked out because they are either already in the pipeline or funded . . . In the Ministry of Agriculture we are in much better shape than any of the other ministries . . . we've got so many long-term projects actually under way, we are ready to move. I could start organizing it. We've got lots of projects and lots of vision where we want to go.

In Works a similar mood of optimism proved justified; in Agriculture it did not. It would appear that the CPDO's overall perception of the state of planning in Government had been buoyed up by a number of large projects already under way or negotiated, and the availability of a number of studies and reports. It underestimated the numerous areas which were un- or ill-prepared, and overlooked the fact that in some departments planning capacity remained so paltry that they were hard put to translate the studies into sectoral plans and projects.

iv *Planning Units*

A further factor in which the CPDO's confidence proved misplaced was the contribution of the Planning Units. During the period of Plan preparation – at the very time when an expansion in their output was most needed – the capacity of the Planning Units actually diminished. One planning adviser whose evaluation of the Plan preparation was generally favourable, conceded that these Units were 'essentially quite weak. It is only with great difficulty that the CPDO has been able to get contributions from them for the Plan'. Interior's one-man Unit existed only from August 1974 to February 1975, and the person concerned said that he did not, and had not been in a position to, 'prepare any submission for the Plan'. In Education, the planner was promoted to Permanent Secretary and succeeded in November 1974 by a man who held another post simultaneously. Not only could he not devote his full attention to planning but he admitted that having arrived at that stage, he lacked the background to participate effectively in the formulation of his Ministry's programme. An expatriate adviser to another division of the Ministry undertook a considerable share of responsibility for the Education Submissions. In Health the Planning Unit, while generally kept in contact with proceedings, was neither centrally involved in nor fully consulted on the Ministry's drafts or negotiations with the Planning Office. The most serious disappointment was the performance of the Agricultural Planning Unit from which much had been anticipated, and which in the event made a meagre contribution to the Plan. Relations between the personnel of this Unit – the largest in any ministry – deteriorated to such an extent that the Unit became non-functional. Tragically, too, the Livestock planner who had been particularly productive, died, and with his death the tenuousness of agricultural planning was exposed. For lengthy periods no communication on the Plan was forthcoming from this Planning Unit and the arrival of documents from the divisions of the Ministry bypassed the Unit.

On the other hand, the Works Planning Unit operated effectively and linked up well with both the Planning Office and the divisions. While there were material differences of opinion between the Unit in Commerce and Industry and the CPDO, that Unit did bear the brunt of its Ministry's work on the Plan. Finally the Unit in the Cabinet complex, with responsibility not only for its divisions but also for public service buildings, enacted a wide array of Plan preparation tasks. On occasions, however, the Unit's numerous non-planning duties were felt by the Planning Office to be postponing progress on the drafting and negotiating of the Plan documents themselves.

v *Continuing activities*

The Planning Office also underestimated the time which it and the rest of the planning machinery would need to devote to its continuing activities such as project formulation and budget preparation, and the many jobs involved in keeping up with the largest number of donor missions ever to visit Lesotho in one year.

vi *Ministries' response*

Before the exercise got under way, a planning officer was asked for his evaluation of the political support for the CPDO, and its standing amongst the ministries. He replied:

> We shall find out when people are told to drop what they are doing and get on with the Five Year Plan – we shall see how much there is foot-dragging or work not getting done – and see what

disciplines are imposed. If the CPDO has to convice everybody like they did last time, there is apt to be neither a good plan nor a plan on time.

As it turned out, there did prove to be considerable 'foot-dragging' and the Planning Office did have a struggle to elicit timely responses from most (but not all) divisions and ministries. For a start the ministries were reluctant to devote time to the physical progress questionnaires and many reminders, phone calls and visits were required before they were completed and returned. Also, the reaction of many departments to the CPDO request for all ministries to appoint contact-men – people who were chiefly responsible for plan preparation and with whom the Planning Office could communicate directly – was sluggish. Finally, as noted above, many of the first set of submissions were two or three months late. In December 1974 the Office complained that the ministries lacked appreciation of the importance of the Plan: 'Some ministries have simply told the CPDO they are too busy when attempts were made to discuss some of their problems and submissions. Those who prepared something did so as a result of numerous visits by the CPDO'.[8]

vii *Staff turnover*

The Planning Office also blamed the continuous turnover of senior officers in the ministries for the slowing down of progress. This not only 'disrupted work but led to changes of approach on certain critical issues'.[9] The problem of turnover continued throughout the period of plan preparation at Permanent Secretary, Head of Departments and Planning Unit levels and with those people appointed as contact-men. The CPDO itself lost its Director, Deputy Director, a Senior Planning Officer, and a few expatriates and Planning Officers, giving rise to complaints on the part of the ministries.

viii *Visits abroad*

The CPDO also found that the frequent visits abroad both of its own senior members and of 'policy level officers' of the ministries were undermining the work on the Plan. 'In most cases, no arrangements for a fully-briefed senior official to follow up work on the Plan was made', and as a result 'nobody would touch anything on the Plan with policy implication during the absence of the head concerned'. This obstacle and its delaying effects were observed throughout the period researched. In particular, the Director of Planning had regularly to attend conferences of an economic or developmental nature and participate in aid missions and even diplomatic visits, such as the King's state visit to Tanzania. His absence often resulted in a loss of direction and urgency in the Office.

ix *District involvement*

The Planning Office did not succeed in effectively involving the district authorities in the exercise. Aware of the criticism that the districts had been totally ignored in preparing the First Plan, the Office organized a tour (its staff being accompanied by representatives of the Lesotho National Development Corporation and the Ministry of Interior) during 1974 to meet the District Administrators and District Development Committees. The officers reported that the meetings were useful, while the District Administrators were encouraged by the interest shown. In accordance witht CPDO's suggestion, over the next two months the

[8]CPDO, *Report on progress on the preparation of the Second Plan*, Maseru, 17/12/74, p 6.
[9]*Ibid*, p 7.

Districts submitted their lists of proposals for the Plan. In addition, the Interior Planning Unit compiled a report containing the requests of the Districts, mainly concerned with abattoirs, cooperatives, dams, schools, clinics, water supplies, tourism, markets, roads and bridges, which it sent to the CPDO.[10] Having made a promising start, however, the Office found itself too busy to follow this up. A promised round of further meetings was first postponed and eventually not held. One District Administrator said: 'The CPO came once last year to ask our advice on the Second Plan – we have no idea what happened to these ideas and have not heard from them again'; while Interior got no reaction from the CPDO on its report. A member of the CPDO felt that the district recommendations came in too late, that is, after most ministries had prepared their thumbnail sketches, and therefore that they were not being taken into account. A second planner commented that in his view the CPDO simply did not have the capacity 'to handle an input of ideas and projects' from the districts. 'As it is, it can't meaningfully communicate with all the ministries. How can it also handle communication with the districts?'

x *Typing capacity*

The Office's typing capacity proved to be unequal to the increased demands. In addition to the vast quantity involved in preparing and re-preparing drafts and tables for the Plan, the various other tasks of the Office (referred to in (v) above), notably project formulation and preparation for visiting missions, were all expanding and with them the typing load. The very fact that the Office had twenty planners in place of twelve added to the burden, as did the growing stress by the planners on recording and reproducing minutes of meetings, producing and distributing extra copies, and so on. The increase of typing staff proved insufficient, and the production of the Plan fell hopelessly behind schedule. Eventually an experienced expatriate typist-cum-editor was needed full-time for lengthy periods to work on the Plan, while the other typists continued with other tasks. The points raised in the rest of this discussion would explain why the whole exercise fell six months behind; the typing bottleneck explains why it was delayed a full year.

xi *Improvements*

Despite the faults in the Planning Office's management and the obstacles which it confronted in the preparation of the Second Plan, those few officials who could recall the preparation of the First Plan felt that there had been substantial improvement.

> Preparation is much better this time. There is a definite idea that the Plan is being prepared. This time we have been asked questions in plenty of time by [our Ministry] and we have given our answer . . . and [the Planning Unit] has come back with a series of questions. There have been two meetings at headquarters . . . The thing has been handled in a logical way. This Plan is going to be a lot more logical than the last and a lot more use.

The CPDO was also complimented on its efficient organization of a donor conference, held in Maseru in April 1975, which was timed to coincide with a fairly advanced stage of Plan formulation. The interaction between donors' representatives and the recipient ministries and departments was regarded by both as extremely productive

> The meeting with the donors was a good step. We are able to understand how donors see projects and how best to present projects.

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[10]Ministry of Interior, Planning Unit, *Report on proposals for the Second Five-Year Development Plan obtained from District tour*, Maseru, August 1974.

It is important, further, to note that the undertaking was a far more ambitious one than was the First Plan[11] – and not only in terms of a far greater capital expenditure. This time the CPDO aimed to avoid one of the principal weaknesses of the 1970–75 Plan, namely the lack of specific projects to back up objectives and targets. The Second Plan was thus conceived as two volumes, the first to include general analyses and statements of policies, objectives and targets, and the second the outlines of all the projects with their approximate costings. In the event, participants generally thought that the content of the Second Plan was far superior to that of the First.

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[11]A brief discussion of the preparation of Lesotho's First Plan is contained in P. Selwyn, *Report on assignment to Lesotho*, IDS Discussion Paper No 5, Institute of Development Studies, 1971.

APPENDIX

The Budget Calendar

The main phases which have been adopted for the various agencies together with approximate dates, are listed in the Budget Calendar below.

1	1st April to 30th April	Review of the economy by Planning. First Review of the current year's capital; expenditure programme by a Finance/Planning working group for submission to the Budget and Development Planing Committee (BDPC).
2	1st April to 31st May	Examination of performance and cost information by operational ministries and departments. First estimates of next year's revenue. First draft Financial Reports and Proposals. (Formulation of capital projects for stock continues throughout the year.)
3	1st April to 30th April	Review of recurrent resources and draft proposals for next year's basic allocations by Finance. Review of capital resources and draft proposals for indicative sectoral allocations by Planning.
4	1st May to 14th May	Joint review of resources and proposals for next year's basic recurrent and indicative sectoral capital allocations by a Finance/Planning working group.
5	15th May	Discussion of the working group's proposals at a consultative meeting of all permanent secretaries under the chairmanship of the Senior PS.
6	16th May	Consideration of the working group's proposals by the Budget and and Development Planning Committee.
7	17th May to 23rd May	Drafting by Finance of a Cabinet memorandum on basic recurrent and indicative sectoral capital allocations. Approval by the Minister of Finance, the Prime Minister, and the Budget Committee of Cabinet.
8	6th June	Approval by Cabinet of basic recurrent and indicative sectoral capital allocations.
9	7th June to 14th June	Estimates call circular drafted by Finance in collaboration with Planning, announcing basic recurrent and indicative sectoral capital allocations.
10	21st June	Estimates call circular issued by Finance.
11	1st July to 14th July	Second review of the current year's capital expenditure programme by a Finance/Planning working group for submission to the Budget and Development Planning Committee.
12	22nd June to 31st Aug.	Final review by operational ministries and departments of their priorities, recurrent and capital, in relation to their basic recurrent and indicative sectoral capital allocations. Completion of Financial Reports and Proposals for recurrent and capital programmes. Detailed draft estimates to Finance and Planning.

13	1st Sept. to 30th Sept.	Receipt and examination of recurrent estimates and second review of recurrent resources by Finance; receipt and examination of capital estimates and second review of capital resources by Planning.
14	1st Oct. to 21st Oct.	Joint review by Finance/Planning working group of current year's capital expenditure programme (3rd review) and next year's resources, proposals and draft estimates, in discussion with chief accounting officers. Formulation of draft proposals for the recurrent and capital parts of the budget.
15	22nd Oct. to 29th Oct.	Consideration by the Budget and Development Planning Committee of the working group's proposals, and discussion with chief accounting officers.
16	30th Oct. to 14th Nov.	Drafting by Finance of the Budget memorandum for Cabinet. Approval by the Minister of Finance, the Prime Minister, and the Budget Committee of Cabinet.
17	30th Nov.	Approval of the budget by Cabinet.
18	7th Dec.	Despatch of approved capital estimates to the British Government by Finance.

The Nigerian Constitution 1979 and the Future Structure of the Nigerian Civil Service

FIDELIS OKOLI*

INTRODUCTION:

Section 157 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria empowers the President of the Federation to appoint, among other officials, (a) the Secretary to the Government of the Federation and (b) the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation. Subsection (3) of the same section provides that: 'An appointment to the office of Head of the Civil Service of the Federation shall not be made except from among members of the Civil Service of the Federation or of a State.'[1]

In like manner, section 188 (2) empowers the State Governor to appoint, among other officials, (a) Secretary to the Government of the State and (b) Head of the State Civil Service. Subsection (3) of the same section provides that: 'An appointment to the office of Head of the Civil Service of a State shall not be made except from among the members of the Civil Service of any State or of the Federation.'[2]

What are the distinguishing features of these two posts? The Secretary to the Government is a political appointment. The incumbent holds office at the pleasure of the President. It is a short-term appointment that fluctuates with changes in political leadership. As a result, the loyalty of the Secretary to the Government goes first and foremost to the President who appoints him. He is identified publicly with all the political programmes of the President and takes measures to ensure their successful execution. In a way he can be described as the 'political administrator' of the Presidential office.

On the other hand, the Head of the Civil Service is a career officer. He holds office by virtue of his qualifications, merit, expertise, acceptability and seniority in the Civil Service. His appointment is permanent and can only be terminated after due processes as stipulated in the Civil Service conditions of service. He is the administrative head of the whole of the Civil Service and renders dispassionate service to all governments no matter their ideological leanings. To function effectively, therefore, the Head of the Civil Service must be above suspicion of any political commitments. His interests are supposed to transcend those of any President or political party and to reflect the higher orientations of the nation. Political neutrality is, therefore, the bastion of the office of the Head of the Civil Service and indeed of the entire Civil Service. General Orders (GO) 04211 makes this very clear by

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[1] *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, 1978), p 53.

[2] *Ibid*, p 63.

providing, among other things, that no officer, employee or member of the temporary staff should, whether on duty or on leave of absence, hold any office paid or unpaid, permanent or temporary, in any political organization; offer himself or nominate anyone else as a candidate at any election or at any stage thereof to be member of a Regional or Federal Legislature or of any local government body; indicate publicly his support of or opposition to any party or policy; engage in canvassing in support of political candidates.

The two posts call for different public postures and comportment. What the one demands of its incumbent, the other forbids. And the virtues one extols, the other downgrades. While one is purely political, the other is merely administrative. Ideally, therefore, the two posts should be occupied by two different individuals.

But as can be seen, nothing in the above constitutional provisions prevents the President or the State Governor from appointing one and the same person both Secretary to the Government and Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or of a State. By the same argument, nothing in the provisions cited above prevents the President or a State Governor from appointing two different persons to the two posts provided, of course, that in the case of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or of any State, the appointee must be a member of the Civil Service of the Federation or of any State. However, the above arguments notwithstanding, the spirit of the Constitution is that the two offices shall be held by two different persons.*

If, for purposes of argument, the posts of Secretary to the Government and Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or of a State are occupied by one and the same individual, we have a continuation of the existing structural arrangement. However, if the two posts are occupied by different individuals, then obviously, we shall expect to have a modification of the structural configurations of the Civil Service at the top echelons of the national and state services.

This is more so because, although the Constitution provides explicitly for the appointment of Head of the Civil Service from among the members of the Civil Service of the Federation or of any State, it is decidedly silent on the identity/background of the Secretary to the Government. In other words, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation or of a State could, at least theoretically, be somebody who has never been in the Civil Service and so has never been initiated into the Civil Service norms and ethics.

Should this happen, a proper delineation of functions and authority relationships between the Secretary to the Government and Head of the Civil Service becomes imperative and urgent. The problem would revolve around the following:

1 Should their authority relationship be of superordinate/subordinate nature?

**The point being made here is that the spirit of the new constitution calls for these two offices to be held by two separate people. But since the posts were indivisable prior to the Military Administration and as a single most powerful office holder combined similar posts during the military regime, it is not altogether out of place to suppose that an Executive President might decide to perpetuate tradition by appointing one and the same person to the two posts even against the spirit of the constitution. (Ed)*

2 Should it be equal and co-ordinate?
3 Should it be complementary?
Whichever authority pattern we opt for is bound to alter to a significant extent the existing structure of the Civil Service. We shall examine each of these relationships later, but first let us examine the existing structure and see why, if at all, there is a need for a change.

THE EXISTING STRUCTURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE:
The existing structure provides for an all-powerful and very prestigious post of the Secretary to the Military Government and Head of the Civil Service. But most often people are dazzled by the simple abbreviation SMG. This post (SMG) conjures up such awe that at a time there was allegedly a discussion on how to differentiate the State SMG and the Federation's. It was later alleged that only the Federation's SMG should add the word 'Chief' to further mystify his mysticism.

In any case, the point here is that the power and prestige of the Secretary to the Military Government (SMG) and Head of the Civil Service derive more from his position as the former and less from the latter. This is simply like stating the obvious. As the SMG, he has access to the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation and sits or is represented in (at least in advisory capacity) most important meetings of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) and the Federal Executive Council (FEC). No other top official of the government has this privileged status. In fact, one may not be blowing out of proportion the position and influence of the SMG and Head of the Civil Service by asserting that he possesses such information that should he decide (and if he has the courage and the tenacity) he could lead the government astray. This is because the Civil Service everywhere, but more especially in the developing nations, is a store house of information. It makes this information available to the Chief Executive and his council for policy-analysis and policy-formulation. As a result of the hierarchical nature of the Civil Service, this information must pass through the SMG and Head of the Civil Service who will then make it available to the Chief Executive and his council. It is at this point that the influence of the SMG and Head of the Civil Service becomes critical. If the Chief Executive and his council are discussing any issue on which the SMG and Head of the Civil Service, for one reason or the other, has interests then the information he supplies could be subtly modified to protect these interests.

Moreover, it is not unknown for a SMG and Head of the Civil Service to use his exalted position to frustrate, humiliate and 'run-down' his colleagues and opponents. Brigadier David M. Jemibewon, the former Military Governor of Oye State aptly brings out the strategic and overriding importance of the office of the SMG and Head of the Civil Service as follows:

'He is the chief adviser to the government and provides leadership for the whole of the service. His duties include the administration of the service which entails writing annual confidential reports on heads of departments, making recommendations to the Public Service Commission on acting appointments, promotion, and discipline of all heads of departments, advising the head of government on service matters including promotion to permanent secretary posts, and award of honours to civil servants. He is chairman of the meeting of permanent secretaries, the administrative staff advisory committee, the senior management staff committee, and the committee on service matters. In a military administration in which the powers of the executive council are vested in the

military governor (note here the magnitude of the SMG's possible influence over the governor) the responsibility of the SMG and Head of the Civil Service in *giving correct and adequate advice on all issues* is even more onerous (emphasis added). He also sits on the executive council and serves statutorily as secretary to the council."[3]

An individual who is so richly endowed with such power resources and power-potentials requires extra humility and tenacity of purpose to fend off intra- and extra-organizational pressures and influence to pervert one or the other of the organizational rules and ethics. The magnitude of the problem becomes even more appalling when the social and cultural environment of the Nigerian Civil Service is taken into account.

Apart from the issue of power concentration and its corrupting influence, the sheer weight of responsibilities resulting from his (SMG and Head of the Civil Service's) involvement in many activities (both political and administrative) militates against any meaningful coordination and most probably results in imperfect control, or diminishing control or even decreasing coordination.[4] And before long, either the political or the administrative activities suffer abysmal neglect depending on the leaning of the SMG and Head of the Civil Service. But in keeping with the nature of things, it is generally the administrative activities that suffer at the expense of the political.

However, it may only be fair to say that the merit of the present structure lies in the fact that it settles once and for all, even if imperfectly, the issue of conflict of authority. Besides, it affords the SMG and Head of the Civil Service the opportunity to initiate, supervise and follow-up an action to the last rung of authority – the Chief Executive – without interruption.

But where there is a division of functions and so a possible conflict of authority, it becomes necessary to specify clearly the spheres of authority and influence of each incumbent. In considering this problem we have the following options:

1 *Superordinate/Subordinate Relationship:*
Should the office of the SMG take precedence over that of the Head of the Civil Service? In order to answer this question, it may be necessary to note, if not to accept, Miles' assertion (although this time not Miles' law[5]) that: 'Organization is an important expression of social values . . . The act of elevating the organizational status of a function, especially when it involves creating an organization that is directly answerable to the President, is first and foremost, an expression of the importance that the President, the Congress, and the Public attach to the purposes of that organization.'[6] In the circumstance, why is it necessary for the Constitution to separate the office and functions of the Secretary to the Government and Head of the Civil Service? Is there a felt need or, as Miles would put it, an 'expression of

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[3]Brigadier David M. Jemibewon, *A Combatant in Government* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nig) Ltd, 1978), p 112.
[4]Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little Brown and Co, 1967), p 271.
[5]Rufus Miles, Jr, postulates the organizational 'law' which says: 'Where you stand depends on where you sit'.
[6]Rufus Miles, Jr, 'Considerations for a President Bent on Reorganization.' *Public Administration Review*, vol 37, no 2 (March/April, 1977), p 156.

national priority' for the creation of an entirely new office directly responsible to the President?

It seems to me that the simple reason for this Constitutional provision lies in the conception of the Civil Service role in post-military administration. It is perhaps, an unconscious reification of an ideal – the ideal of non-politicization of the Civil Service and a consequent attempt to insulate the Head of the Civil Service from the whims and caprices of the political leadership. In other words, the framers of the Constitution are only giving expression to their hearts' desire of completely protecting the Civil Service and its leadership from politics by providing an alternative channel of communication to the President. But having done this, the Frankenstein monster emerges – which of them will be superior?

According to *The Bureaucrat*, 'Although the post of the Secretary to the Government has been listed first practice elsewhere supports the view that the Head of the Civil Service should take precedence over the *Secretary to the Government who is a civil servant and therefore a member of the civil service over which the Head of the Civil Service superintends*." (Emphasis is mine) This argument is at best *non sequitur* and at worst a demonstration of civil service chauvinism. Why must *The Bureaucrat* conclude almost off-handedly that the Secretary to the Government ought to be a civil servant? Certainly the Constitution does not insist on that. The Secretary to the Government could be appointed from outside the Civil Service! Perhaps, *The Bureaucrat*'s argument is a clear testimony to the bureaucratic mentality which stands between the Civil Service and innovations. According to Ukpabi Asika, 'By a bureaucratic mentality one refers to the fact that in spite of the concentration of expertise in the public service, the public service has only proved itself competent in the management and maintenance of the existing system and in a seemingly congenital incapacity to assimilate new ideas directed toward change.'[8] The Civil Service has always been known to resist, frustrate and nullify all changes or ideas which, even in the remotest sense, tend to threaten its present structure.

However, one thing seems to be clear from *The Bureaucrat*'s position. The Civil Service will fight against any arrangement that will place the Secretary to the Government over and above the Head of the Civil Service. Perhaps, *The Bureaucrat*'s editorial is only a trial balloon designed to warn the authorities if such a thing is being contemplated.

On the other hand, it does not seem organizationally expedient to place the Secretary to the Government under the Head of the Civil Service. For one thing, the Secretary to the Government should have direct access to the President and his personal staff. Moreover, the very nature of his functions means that he should sit in the meetings of the highest body of the land and in this capacity, occasionally call for information and clarification of points from the Head of the Civil Service, who should in turn supply these as part of his job. This alone makes it problematic for the Secretary to the Government to be under the Head of the

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[7] *The Bureaucrat*, vol 6, no 4 (October/December, 1978), pp 2–3.

[8] Ukpabi Asika, 'Strategy for Agricultural Development.' An Address to the Third Meeting of the National Council on Agriculture in Enugu on 28th July, 1972.

Civil Service. Again, if as we noted earlier, the creation of this new office or more appropriately, its separation from the Head of the Civil Service, is an 'expression of national priority', then the issue is decidedly settled in favour of the Secretary to the Government. Hence, under the circumstance, a position of superordinate/subordinate relationship in favour of the Head of the Civil Service is untenable. In a slightly different argument, since the Secretary to the Government could come from outside the Civil Service, at least theoretically, it would be administratively unwise to place him over the Head of the Civil Service. If not for anything else, the fact that he does not belong to the 'cult' vitiates his leadership effectiveness. Again, should the Secretary to the Government be appointed from the Civil Service, his placement over and above the Head of the Civil Service is bound to create untold administrative problems too. Hence the pre-eminent position of the Secretary to the Government *vis-à-vis* the Head of the Civil Service is equally tendentious.

2 *Equal and Co-ordinate Relationship:*

This situation immediately brings to the fore the very problem which the new provision raises. Obviously, the Civil Service is not likely to accept any structural arrangement that will 'smack' of parallel and competing organization. Such a situation is bound to threaten the *status quo* and so impair the entrenched interests of the civil servants. Moreover, the idea of a parallel, competing organization seems an anathema, an absurdity. Such a thing should not be thought of. Not just because it is wasteful of resources, but also because it breeds confusion, duplication and overlap. But recently there has been a movement toward duplication and overlap. The leading exponent of 'redundancy', Professor Martin Landau, claims that the reliability of any organization increases exponentially with multiplication of its parts.[9] It is now being increasingly recognized that: 'The multiplication of single purpose organizations is increasingly hazardous to societal welfare. The chances of breakdown are enhanced by overdependence on the performance of individual parts. The risk is diminished in each problem or policy area by the presence of numerous overlapping, multifunctional institutions, which provide numerous checks and counter-checks on each other. Such built-in societal redundance is indispensable in turbulent societies.'[10]

This new movement for organizational reform and design has succeeded in at least pinpointing the possibility and necessity of alternative channels of communication and centres of action. Whether it is within or outside the same organization, the message is clear. Do not depend on only one channel. It could be hazardous. Rufus Miles, Jr, puts it succintly when he cautions: 'Never trust any single line of communication to give you the truth about what is going on, or to give you 'unbiased' counsel as to what should be done about a serious problem. Any single line of communication is bound to be influenced by the strong desire of the communicators to make themselves look good, and especially to avoid looking bad; their desire to influence the administrator's decisions in a manner favourable to them; and their desire to increase their power *vis-à-vis* other competitive components of the organization, or at least not lose any.'[11]

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[9]Martin Landau, 'Redundancy, Rationality and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap.' *Public Administration Review*, 29 (July/August, 1969), 346–358.

[10]Gerald E. Caiden, *The Dynamics of Public Administration: Guidelines to Current Transformations in Theory and Practice* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1971), p 295.

[11]Rufus Miles, Jr, *op cit*, p 402.

Perhaps, this message is at the root of the new Constitutional provision. So whether the Civil Service likes it or not, the Constitution has taken the bull by the horns and has decreed, as it were, that an alternative channel is not necessary but possible. The issue now is the exact working relationship between the channels. In the absence of the superordinate/subordinate, and equal and coordinate relationships, it seems only plausible to opt for the remaining alternative – complementary relationship.

3 *Complementary Relationship:*

According to the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 'to complement is to provide something felt to be lacking or needed, it is often applied to putting together two things, each of which supplies what is lacking in the other, to make a complete whole.'[12] We have already noted that the mere fact of creating a new office is regarded as an 'expression of national priority'. In other words, there is a felt need to remedy a deficiency in the existing monolithic structure superintended by the all-powerful Secretary to the Government and Head of the Civil Service. Having thus separated the offices, a way must be found to harness fruitfully and effectively, the advantages of the separation. Since patterns of superordinate/subordinate, and equal and coordinate relationships do not seem to offer these advantages, the two offices must coexist and complement each other.

On paper, this organization arrangement of complementarity seems appropriate and laudable. But when it comes to designing such an organization, problems of channels and directions of communication, lines and spheres of authority, control and coordination multiply. However, in spite of these problems, an attempt has been made here to sketch a model of complementary relationship for the Secretary to the Government and the Head of the Civil Service in their relationship with the President. The main purpose of this sketch is to generate discussions along this line so as to focus attention of both academics and practitioners on the problem raised by the Constitutional provision.

THE SKETCH (FIGURE 1)

The arrows indicate the flow of communication and line of authority. Both the Secretary to the Government and the Head of the Civil Service should have direct, uninterrupted access to the President/Governor on matters that fall specifically within their respective areas of authority. They should sit securely at the apex of their respective pyramid of authority on all matters affecting their respective domains. However, whenever there is an overlap, in other words, when an issue emanating from one authority area criss-crosses another, there is a need for clearanace and cooperation. At this point, both of them should descend from their lofty heights of authority and power to lowly ones of persuasion and influence. This is represented by the double arrows. For example, if as a result of pressure groups activities an issue is initiated by the political channel of the Secretary to the Government, and it requires information and issue clarification from an appropriate ministry or agency handling such issues, then the Secretary to the Government should pass down the matter through the Head of the Civil Service to the relevant ministry or agency for comments, clarifications and, if need be, action. In like manner, issues emanating from the ministries and agencies would pass through the Head of the Civil Service to the Secretary to the

[12] *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, College Edition, (New York: Random House, 1968).


President / Governor
Head of the Civil Service
Secretary to the Government
Independent Statutory Bodies
The Civil Service
Governmental Agencies, Corporations and Commissions
Presidential personal Staff
Presidential Advisory Commissions and Task Force Units
Judiciary
Audit
Local Government Service Board
Public Service Commission

Government if the need arises. The President/Governor, on his part could demand information, advice and comments from both channels. Moreover, he could, by judicious manipulation, cross-check one information channel against another for reliability. This is perhaps, where the advantages of redundancy could be maximized.

This sketch does not in any way discount the existing arrangement whereby certain independent statutory bodies (such as the Judiciary, Audit, Local Government Service Board, Public Service Commission) have direct access to the President/Governor. This should continue as represented by the arrows. But in addition, they should have direct contact with both the Secretary to the Government and the Head of the Civil Service as represented by the double arrows. This direct contact with both the Secretary of the Government and the Head of the Civil Service is necessary because there are certain issues which these bodies must clear with them before taking them to the President/Governor.

Tribunals for Land Reforms in Andhra Pradesh

N. UMAPATHY*

Land reform is a purposeful re-planning of a land tenure system with the authority of the Government. But it has been observed that the presence of strong political constraints operating against the programme, the inadequate and softer provisions of the legislation and the operation of strong vested interests, are all contributing to the general failure of the programme in India. The administrative machinery is also the target of attack. Therefore, it is proposed to examine how far the latter criticism can be justified, by examining the constitution and working of the Land Reforms Tribunals in Andhra Pradesh, from the viewpoint of a student of Public Administration.

It may be recalled that in India though land is a state subject, the Union Government has been taking a serious interest and guiding the States in matters of land reform. In pursuance of the Preamble to the Constitution of India, and Article 39 (b) and (c) in Chapter IV dealing with the Directive Principles of State Policy, the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceilings on Agricultural Holdings) Act, Act I of 1973, was enacted. The Act is based largely on the recommendations of the Central Team on Land Reforms.[1] It came into effect from the first day of January, 1975. Section 4 of the Act is the operative and substantive section. The entire exercise under the Act is to fix the ceiling area in each case as laid down in this section. For this purpose, different extents of land of different classes have been equated in terms of standard holdings (Section 5 (1) and (2)). The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of not more than five members is one standard holding,[2] which varies from 10 to 54 acres depending on the classification of the land.[3] A family consisting of more than 5 members is allowed an additional extent of 1/5 of the standard holding for each additional member, which shall not, in the aggregate, exceed two standard holdings.[4] After fixation of such ceiling area in each case, the surplus land, if any, is taken over by the Government on payment of compensation. Compensation is based on the amount of land revenue charged and is is on a decreasing graduated scale.

In order to fix the ceiling area in respect of each land-holder an obligation is cast on every person to declare all land held by him either as owner or in any other capacity, as the ceiling is to be applied to the totality of all such lands. And, in order to provide for an inquiry to

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[1]The recommendations were made by Fakruddin Ali Ahmad Committee in 1971. These recommendations adopted by the Congress Working Committee on 24.1.1971, were to be the basis of Land Reforms Legislation throughout India. Hence, the date 24th January, 1971, is crucial under the Act.

[2]Section 4 of the Act.

[3]Section 5, Table on Page 9 of the Act.

[4]Section 4 (2) of the Act.

determine the extent of surplus land, provision is made in the Act for the constitution of Land Reforms Tribunals to which a comprehensive set of functions is entrusted. Therefore, the Land Reforms Tribunals are the primary and principal instruments through which land reforms are implemented. Of course, the Revenue Department is also involved but its role is secondary and is confined to assisting the Tribunals.

While many studies in Public Administration have highlighted the role played by administrative personnel in policy-making and its implementation, their increasing role as quasi-judicial authorities especially in the context of social and economic reforms, has not been the subject matter of focus. If the former role of the administrative personnel has serious implications for political development, the latter has equally so on the administration of justice. In any case both roles raise the question of control over the dominating position of the bureaucracy. It is the thesis of this paper that while legislature and executive government control the bureaucracy in so far as its policy-making role is concerned, the judicial authorities and the statutory provisions of law and the procedure prescribed, regulate the proceedings and order of the bureaucracy when it is charged with functions of a judicial character. Thus administrative personnel are responsible more to legal institutions than to the executive, though they are within the broad framework of the administrative machinery under the general direction and control of the executive. In a way this enhances the stature of administrative bodies because of the confidence reposed in them to function as autonomous bodies by and large, at the behest of the executive which initiates the legislation. Thus there is a move towards functional differentiation within the Revenue Department. This is a consequence of the Government's desire to secure a reconciliation between the rights of an individual and the demands of the society at large through a judicial approach.

This leads to three questions: (i) Whether the personnel manning the Tribunals drawn exclusively from the Revenue Department, can be considered as suitable and competent; (ii) Whether they can discharge their functions independently without being subject to extraneous considerations and (iii) Whether the methods and procedures of the Tribunals are as satisfactory as they should be so as to conform to the judicial approach of the courts of law. These questions arise for two reasons: one, the general aversion to tribunals and second, the general feeling that the revenue personnel are inefficient, corrupt and that they are oriented more towards the regulatory functions than to socio-economic reforms.

Administrative Machinery:

The administrative machinery charged with the functions relating to land reforms is set out in the following table:


Head Quarters: Minister for Revenue
Secretariat level: Secretary to the Government (Revenue Department)
Executive level: Special Commissioner (Land Reforms)
Special Officer (Land Reforms)
Assistant Secretary
Field Organisation:
Executive Authorities
Collectors (21)
District Revenue Officers (21)
District Land Reform Officers (RDO's Rank) & Ex-officio P.As. to Collectors (21)
Tahsildars (Regular Tahsildar of the Taluq concerned)
Special Deputy Tahsildars (311) (Land Reforms) for each taluq for verification of the declarations filed
Quasi-Judicial authorities
Land Reforms Appellate Tribunals (21) (Chairman: Sessions Judge)
Land Reforms Tribunals (93) (Chairman: Additional Revenue Divisional Officer (Land Reforms)
Parties before the Tribunals
Special Tahsildars (Land Reforms) and Authorised Representatives of the Government (93)
Declarant/landholder

(N.B. Figures in brackets indicate the actual number of Officers).

Originally there were 69 Tribunals in the State to which 24 more were added, and in June, 1977, there were 81 of them. Their number in each of the districts varies from one to eight depending on the work load, i.e. the number of declarations filed. These Tribunals are statutory bodies with the status of a civil court. They are all single member Tribunals with an officer of the rank of a Revenue Divisional Officer, designated as an Additional Revenue Divisional Officer, as Chairman. Each of the Tribunals has its own separate staff. Besides, necessary staff has been given also to the Revenue Department which plays a complementary role.

Functions of the Tribunal:

The Tribunal receives and registers the declarations of holdings given by land-holders and may call for declarations and where a person fails to furnish such declarations, it may obtain the necessary information in the manner prescribed. It publishes all the declarations and information received, and makes them available for public inspection. It refers the declarations for local inspection and verification by the *Tahsildar* concerned. After giving due notice to the parties concerned including the Authorized Representative of the Government, and the objectors, if any, it inquires, into the declarations by hearing them personally and/or through their legal representatives. After such enquiry it passes an order indicating: (i) the extent of land that should go to the declarant and his major sons, and fixes up the shares of the 'minor' sons equally since irrespective of religion all of them are given equal shares under the statute, and (ii) the extent of land held in surplus, if any. The work of the Tribunal does not end with its orders in this regard. The Tribunal calls upon the person holding surplus land to file a statement containing full particulars of the land he proposes to surrender, failing which the Tribunal will select the land itself, giving an opportunity to the person to state his objections, if any, and a similar opportunity to the general public. The Tribunal communicates its final orders to declarant and to the objectors, if any, and to the RDO and the *Tahsildar*. It determines the amount of compensation payable to the declarant and the respective shares of all the claimants to such compensation. The Tribunal is required to prepare estimates of the amount required to take over the surplus lands, to get the necessary funds from the Collector and to arrange for payments to the lawful claimants. Finally, it is the Tribunal that directs the RDO concerned to take possession of the surplus land surrendered and to proceed with its distribution to eligible applicants (Rule 7(6)). Thus the Tribunals perform a comprehensive set of functions, all of which are vital and crucial for the success of land reforms.

Assistance to the Tribunals:

The performance of a comprehensive set of functions relating especially in matters of land is not an easy task, and therefore provision has been made for considerable assistance to the Tribunals by the Revenue Department staff. The Special Deputy Tahsildars appointed exclusively for this purpose gather evidence and information on each of the declarations filed and report the same to the Tribunals. They prepare an exhaustive verification report and answer the questionnaire appended to it.

Powers of the Tribunal and its Authority:

The Tribunal has the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, for summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining

him on oath and for requiring production of any document (Section 22 (1)).[5] The Tribunal is authorized to issue a notice to any person requiring him to furnish a declaration of his holdings (Section 8 (2)), to launch prosecutions (Section 24), to confirm the *Taram/Bhaganna* provisionally determined by the *Tahsildar* in certain cases (Rule 19), to determine whether any transaction has taken place in contravention of the provisions of the Act (Section 19 (6)); to treat as null and void all transactions which are in contravention of the AP Agricultural Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act 1972 (Section 7 (2)); to ignore all conversions of agricultural lands into non-agricultural lands made within a period of five years before the notified date, and to treat such lands as agricultural lands (Section 7 (3)); to determine the excess land, to accept or refuse the surrender of any land; to select the land to be surrendered; to permit the surrender of land by women as well as men; to order the retransfer of the land surrendered by a person, and so on.

By a recent amendment to the 1973 Act, the Tribunal is now empowered to reopen any case and to decide it afresh. May be, this may give some relief to the land-holder. The Tribunal is also empowered to make orders incidental or ancillary to its decisions, and to correct any mistake arising out of any accidental error or omission (Rule 16 (5) (a) and (b)). Thus the powers and the authority of the Tribunal are very wide. No wonder the statute itself provides certain checks and safeguards by way of prescribing the procedure to be followed by the Tribunals and subjecting their orders to the scrutiny of appellate authorities.

The orders of the Tribunal are final subject only to the decision of the Appelate Tribunal[6] in appeal and that of the High Court in revision, and only in certain specified matters and cases. This is fair enough from the point of natural justice and to prevent miscarriages of justice. If thus the orders of the Tribunal are final unless appealed against, the question arises as to whether it is in a position to ensure justice. This requires a study of its composition and procedures.

Composition of the Tribunals:

A unique feature of the Tribunals is that they are all single member ones with only the revenue officials of the rank of Deputy Collectors designated as the Additional Revenue Divisional Officers and Chairmen of the Tribunals. This is a deviation from the statutory provision which says that a Tribunal shall consist of not more than three members *one of whom* shall be a person of the rank of *a Deputy Collector or a District Munsiff* and that such person shall be the Chairman.[7] Indeed, this deviation is permitted by the statute itself which says that the proceedings of any Tribunal shall *not* be invalid by reason only of the existence of any vacancy among its members or any defect in the constitution or reconstitution.[8] It would be, therefore, interesting to examine the reasons which might

[5]This is elaborated further under Rule 16 (10) (b) which says that a Tribunal shall have the power to examine the parties and witnesses on oath or affirmation, to reduce into writing the statements made by them, to receive evidence on affidavits, and to issue commissions for examination of witnesses.

[6]Section 20 (1) and (3) of the Act. The Appellate Tribunals presided over by judicial officers of the rank of District Judge do not form part of the study.

[7]Section 6 (2).

[8]Section 6 (5).

have prompted the Government to prefer the Deputy Collector and to keep two posts vacant.

The non-appointment of the officers of the rank of Deputy Munsiff may be attributed to the following reasons: (i) their knowledge of revenue administration will be inadequate; (ii) their inclusion in the Tribunal will raise the question of according them appropriate status *vis-à-vis* the Deputy Collector, for their appointment only as members would amount to subordinating a judicial officer to an executive officer and (iii) issuing instructions for purposes of implementation would be difficult. Thus a number of reasons seem to have cumulatively contributed to the non-appointment of District Munsiffs. This raises a doubt as to why then was the provision made for their inclusion. Two answers can be guessed. Maybe the Government wanted to have a smooth sailing at the legislative stage by assuring that matters of civil rights would be taken care of properly because of the presence of a judicial officer. Or, maybe, the Government, at the time of introducing the bill, was unaware of the difficulties that might arise due to the inclusion of a judicial officer.

If the non-appointment of judicial officers can be justified on certain grounds, what positive arguments can be advanced in favour of including the revenue officers? First, their knowledge of law acquired by passing the Revenue, Civil, and Criminal Judicial Tests is more relevant and more or less equal to that of the judicial officers. Second, they have knowledge of inherent and statutory rights pertaining to land under a host of revenue laws, and special knowledge of the local customs and practices which vary from place to place, unlike the officers of the judiciary. Third, their experience in the performance of quasi-judicial functions as part of the revenue courts system especially in earlier land reform measures is considerable. This knowledge and experience has been supplemented by the training programme for the Deputy Collectors as appointed as Additional RDOs concerned with the implementation of the Ceilings Act. During the training course they were enlightened on many legal aspects forming part of the civil laws like adoption, marriage and divorce, all of which have a bearing on the questions that arise before the Tribunals.

If thus the Deputy Collector is perferred to the exclusion of the District Munsiff, what are the reasons for keeping the other two posts vacant. Perhaps these two posts were intended to be thrown open to non-official members so as to associate them in the implementation of a vital scheme like land reform. But non-officials or politicians, may find it difficult to comprehend the nature of the issues that arise and the law bearing on the subject. Their presence may give scope for a free play of their political affiliations, if any, and thereby hamper the smooth working of the Tribunals. Then, the question of choosing disinterested non-officials is a very difficult exercise. And if the non-official members are to be chosen from among the legislators, different political parties would stake their claims for the posts and this creates its own problems. Securing their full-time attention as members of the Tribunals would be difficult. In view of these points, the non-appointment of non-officials seems to have been for the best. Why, then, does such a provision find a place in the legislation? Maybe the Goverment was unaware of the delicate questions that might arise or it did not like to give the impression that land reform is the concern of the Goverment exclusively.

To sum up, due to various reasons two posts have been kept vacant. Consequently, the Tribunals are one-man Tribunals with only the revenue officers as the Chairmen which is a misnomer.

Procedures:

The procedures governing the proceedings of the Tribunal are prescribed by the rules formulated by the Goverment under Section 27, some of which are prescribed by the statute itself.[9] Rule 16 is worth a look in view of the comprehensive provisions included in it. All proceedings are to be summary but the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are to be followed to the extent necessary. The Tribunal, subject to the provisions of the Rules is free to regulate its proceedings. Hearings are to be public, and all decisions to be in writing, setting forth the reasons for the decisions reached. In fact the contentions of the parties are examined in detail and the conclusions of the Tribunal on each of the issues framed, are stated. A party may be represented by his agent or a legal practitioner in the proceedings of the Tribunal. Individuals and bodies who have a substantial interest including the Government, are permitted to appear and to be heard and to adduce evidence and crossexamine witnesses (Rule 6 (2)). The information obtained by the Tribunal in respect of all declarations is to be published for the benefit of all concerned. A copy of the Verification Report of the *Tahsildar* – a very vital document – on the lands held by an individual, is to be given to both parties, namely the land-holder and the Government which is represented by its Authorized Representative. To ensure justice, any objections, raised are entertained and heard *at almost every step* starting from the availability of the declaration till the amount of compensation is paid.[10] Thus a perusal of the procedures prescribed and their observance in practice reveals that it is more or less akin to the judicial procedure. Therefore, it can be said that the Land Reform Tribunals also function as courts of law, of course, with a few innocuous differences. Hence, there can be no objection to their creation and functioning because the principles of natural justice are reflected fully in the prescriptions of the Statute, which prevent arbitrary disposal of cases and miscarriage of justice.

The Tribunal at work:

If thus the 'design' of the Tribunals is rational, the question to be answered is as to how it is working. At the outset it may be said that the working of the Tribunals appears to have been very carefully visualized as is evident from the rules formulated. The officers posted were oriented towards their job and were not disturbed from their positions, a feature uncommon in administrative systems. These factors seem to have facilitated their smooth working.

The Tribunal takes up a case as and when the enquiry report on a declaration is available, which generally does not take more than a month from the date of its filing. As said earlier,

[9]See for instance Sections 7, 9 and 10 (2).

[10]Two categories of 'objectors' can be distinguished: one, under Rule 4 (2), anybody can file his objections within 15 days of the notification displaying the declaration of a land-holder for the information of the public; second, any person having a legal interest in the land covered by the declaration can file his objections at any time during the pendency of the case. The Tribunal is required to give notice of the date set for hearing objections.

there is separate investigating and scrutinizing staff under the Revenue Department. Copies of the enquiry report are given to the land-holder/declarant and the Authorized Representative of the Government (of the rank of *Tahsildar*), who appears as one of the parties before the Tribunal. He puts forth his contentions and objections, if any, before the Tribunal when it takes up a case to determine the extent of land held in surplus by a landlord. The Tribunal's notices are served to the declarant by the *Tahsildar* of the Revenue Department or by post and thus efforts are made to inform the parties well in advance. A Tribunal in the initial stages, generally used to take up nearly forty to fifty cases every day and dispose them of on the very same day by working overtime. There were either no or very few objections in many cases and so only very few to be heard. Very few cases were adjourned and that too only when there were complicated issues or when the required information was not available because of the matter pending elsewhere.

Generally it is expected that the orders of the Tribunal should be given within fifteen days. But in practice they are given almost on the same day of hearing, and in any case not delayed beyond a week. The decisions and orders contain the reasons therefor and include the issues for consideration and the findings of the Tribunal thereon. Thus the orders are 'Speaking Orders' to which the judiciary attaches great importance. Some doubts have, of course, been raised as to whether the RDOs are well-equipped to apply their mind carefully in the discharge of their judicial functions. It is said that this is because their experience would be largely as executive and supervisory officers and whatever quasi-judicial experience they acquire is on the basis of the notes put up by the office staff, and hence they may not have the real grasp of the subject and issues that arise under land reforms. But this has not been felt by many Chairmen as affecting the quality of their decisions and orders.[11] However, there is a feeling that it would have been better if there was a selection of officers on the basis of their aptitude and competency.

As said earlier, the proceedings before the Tribunals are summary and therefore there is a feeling that they may not give as much satisfaction as do the courts of law. This is more imaginary than real because the statute and the rules prescribe a procedure which is close to that followed by the judiciary. However, looked at from another angle there appears to be some genuine reason for the feeling. Because of the heavy pressure of work, the Tribunals were forced to dispose of as many cases as possible as quickly as they could and as a result they could not perhaps give adequate time to consider some matters as carefully as they should. This was pointed out by the legal representatives of declarants who objected on the grounds that they were not being given sufficient time to present their cases before the Tribunal.[12]

In view of the heavy work entrusted to them, the Tribunals devised a strategy of their own

[11]Information obtained from interviews.

[12]Hence, the Advocates submitted a petition to the High Court through the Bar Council, and the High Court directed the Government to avoid pressing the Tribunals to dispose of as many cases as possible. In an interview it was explained that the heavy targets prescribed posed serious difficulties to the Chairmen since they were all alone in the performance of their duties and therefore they sought unofficially the assistance of the Tahsildar representing the Government in examining the different points in some cases.

to dispose of their cases. The strategy consisted of sorting out the cases into three categories: those which did not fall within the purview of the ceiling at all; those which fell on the border line with either slightly less or more than the standard holding permitted, and finally, those which were clear cases of surplus land held. The first and the second category of cases were subjected to careful scrutiny so as to examine whether any means were employed to avoid the provisions of law.[13] Such cases as were free from complications were first disposed of quickly, and the rest were taken up later.

One of the striking features in the working of the Tribunals is that their decisions are strictly in accordance with the provisions of law. This is evident from the following cases. Under the Hindu Law, the son-in-law staying with his in-laws as an *illintam* son-in-law is entitled to an equal share of the property. But the Land Ceilings Act is silent in this regard, and therefore the Tribunals did not allow for any portion of the land to be deducted from the holding of a declarant as representing the share of his son-in-law. Secondly, the Tribunals in accordance with the provisions of the ceilings law, did not recognize unregistered sales. Thus in view of the law being silent on these two aspects, the Tribunals could not accede to the relief claimed and consequently the parties had to go in appeal where they succeeded. Of course, the Tribunals cannot be held responsible as they had to follow the provisions of law strictly and accept only documentary evidence on questions of fact. It is, perhaps, for this reason that so far no criticisms have been made by the Appellate Tribunals and the High Court on the decisions and orders of the primary Tribunals in so far as legal issues are concerned.

To sum up, the working of the Tribunals has been remarkably smooth.[14] But it is the operation of certain external factors that came in the way of greater progress and quicker completion of their task. The Tribunals have to follow the law which has some

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[13]The Tribunals could detect that pleas of adoptions, family settlements, partitions, alienations, were put forth by the land-holders to minimize the effect of the ceiling law. In some cases they could detect tampering of records. Consequently, the disposal of such cases was delayed which the Tribunals could not help.

[14]In an interview it was learnt that there were no procedural difficulties that hampered the working of the Tribunals. The smooth working of the Tribunals is evident from the fact that within a period of two and a half years since their establishment, 96.5% of the cases were disposed of. Further the speed at which they disposed of the cases was such that the executive machinery lagged behind in taking possession of the land declared as surplus and in distributing it to eligible people.By June 1977, about 40,350 acres of wet land and 471,160 acres of dry land was available for taking possession. But only 13,000 acres (a little less than one third) of wet land and only 214,682 acres (a little less than half) of dry land, was taken possession of. Again, out of the less than one-third of the wet land and out of the less than half of the dry land taken possession of, only a little more than a half was actually distributed in both cases (Source: Progress Report of June 1977). The quality of the decisions/orders of the Tribunal appears to be highly satisfactory, if the number of appeals filed is any criterion. Out of the 425,800 cases disposed of by the Tribunals, appeals were filed only in 30,260 cases (i.e. about 7%) which includes 1,840 appeals filed by the Government (Source: Progress Report of June 1977).

shortcomings.[15] The revenue records were found to be neither up-to-date nor clear, as a result both the Tribunals and the parties concerned faced difficulties. The disposal of some cases was delayed because some relevant matter or other pertaining to them was pending elsewhere. Besides, the legal representatives were found to be giving an intelligent but unforseen twist to the law[16] which had to be understood by the Tribunals so as to avoid defective and wrong orders being made. Further, after much of the work was completed the Tribunals were faced with the task of *revising their orders* due to the decisions of the Appellate Tribunals and the High Court, and also *because of an amendment* to the ceilings law in April 1977, which allows one holding to every major son. This is no small task as the lands already distributed, after taking over from those who held in surplus, have to be resumed by dispossessing the beneficiaries[17] and given back to the original owners who had invoked the provisions of the amendment. In short it is not so much the Tribunal of its working as the external factors that seem to be responsible for the delay in the expeditious completion of the task of taking over the surplus lands.

Conclusions:

It may now be desirable to conclude by making an assessment of the position and working of the Land Reforms Tribunals. This can be done best by reference to the general criticisms made against tribunals. It is said that tribunals consisting of government officials and/or non-officials cannot function independently and therefore they would not be able to render justice. Secondly, it is pointed out that tribunals dispose of matters largely on grounds of administrative expediency disregarding the rights of individuals and that therefore their approach falls short of the judicial procedure and process for which reason it is emphasised that they should at least observe the principles of natural justice. But the experience of Land Reforms Tribunals speaks otherwise and reassures the student of Public Administration as the following points demonstrate:

1 The Land Reforms Tribunals being statutory bodies with the status of civil courts find their powers and functions set out by an act of the legislature and therefore it is obligatory for them to function strictly according to the law. The composition of the Tribunals is as good as it could be made. The exclusion of non-official members has presented possible political controversies which might well have arisen due to their political affiliations.

2 The decisions and orders of the Tribunals are subject only to the appellate and revisionary jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunals and the High Court respectively which provide adequate opportunity to the aggrieved to seek justice. The Government has no powers to interfere with the orders of the Tribunals and if public interest is involved, it can

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[15]One Tribunal noticed an interesting defect in the law. It does not say anything as to how the Tribunals should deal with cases when two or more persons file separate declarations in respect of one and the same piece of land held by them in different capacities. When one of the parties is permitted to retain the land, the same piece of land held by others becomes surplus. But the Revenue Department cannot acquire the surplus because it is only an artificial surplus and is only on paper.

[16]This was done by NOT including the lands sold prior to 1.1.75 which were not in their possession.

[17]Consequently the assignee of the surplus land actually enjoying it, becomes a landless person once again – a retrograde step.

go on appeal. This proves that sincere intentions of the Goverment and enhances the status of the Tribunals.

3 The procedures to be followed by the Tribunals are more or less akin to the judicial ones and are laid down by the statute itself. The principles of natural justice expected to be followed by Tribunals have found their due place in the Statute and therefore they are mandatory.

4 Besides providing two opportunities to go in appeal, the Statute provides that parties can be represented through their advocates. This is highly desirable in a country like India where the masses in the rural areas ar often ignorant and illiterate.

Thus both by their design and working, the Land Reforms Tribunals have come close to the judicial procedure and process and have thereby justified their creation. This is a significant development and has its own implications. Firstly, both by their design and working, the Tribunals have enriched the system of land administration in particular and Indian Administration in general. Secondly, the civil servants at the middle level have found their assignments as Chairmen of the Tribunals enriching their careers due to the judicial experience they obtain. Thirdly, given the basic framework of a programme in the form of law, the civil service can still be trusted to implement important socio-economic reforms. Fourthly, though a part of administrative machinery, tribunals can serve as guardians of law and justice and that they cannot be considered as bad *per se* and as jeopardising the rights of citizens. The experience of Land Reforms Tribunals shows that by designing the structure and procedures carefully it is possible to make them acceptable to courts of law and to the citizenry. If this lesson is followed in the future then earlier aversion to tribunals in general may soon fade away, and pave the way for more tribunals to deal with the increasing regulatory functions of the State, and thereby successfully decentralize the administration of justice.

Public Enterprises in Nigeria

SAMIR M FARID

INTRODUCTION

The last two decades have witnessed the proliferation of public enterprises all over the world. Most developing countries have acknowledged the necessity of establishing public enterprises as government corporations, granting them authority to perform specific services in specific fields of activity. Regardless of their form of organization, these public enterprises operate in a number of economic fields, but are predominantly found in such activities as banking and finance, industry and commerce, resources development, and the operation of utilities providing communications, power and transportation services. The prime reasons for the creation of public enterprises – which in theory at least possess a degree of autonomy – are: (a) the need to undertake massive capital development on a national or regional scale; (b) the insufficient initiative the private sector has shown in exploiting a country's scarce resources (financial and human) in a way essential to economic development; (c) the need to ensure that some economic activities are subject to political control by the legislature and the executive in their respective fields or spheres.[1] In a word, public enterprises are looked upon as an instrument of public policy just as much as the government sector exercising conventional functions.[2]

These reasons make it clear that the permissible limits and contours of the intervention and initiative of the State, which may differ from one country to another, is no longer an economic anathema or policitical tabu. It becomes – quite apart from any political motivation – an indispensable and important part of any government to reduce economic imbalance, to plan and implement projects and schemes deemed essential to the needs of the country, and to provide a foundation for industrial growth in those activities necessarily unprofitable under strictly private operation. For these sound reasons, public enterprises have proliferated to an uncontrolable extent giving rise to a three-dimensional dilemma: (a) how to co-ordinate and control the activities of these enterprises in such a way as to ensure that achievements optimistically expected of them still eventuate; (b) how to devise an administrative body with its structure subject to the government's direction especially in important matters of national policy but at the same time has the freedom of action in its day-to-day operations; and (c) how to co-ordinate the activities and policies of public enterprises with major decisions on government policy while the government's direct role is small or even negligible.

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[1]For a detailed discussion of the reasons for the creation of public enterprises see, for example, J. J. Spengler, 'Bureaucracy and Political Development', in J. LaPalombara, (ed.) *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp 226-230.

[2]W. A. Robson, *Nationalized Industries and Public Ownership*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962), p 74.

In the context of development, this dilemma is of particular importance. The control of public enterprises is one of the so many responsibilities the government must undertake. Therefore, if the number of public enterprises becomes too much, governmental control might become impossible at a certain point. At this point, the public enterprises are likely to enjoy automatically the freedom of action which is one of their claimed virtues; but at the same time, it is very likely that this freedom would be abused. The following figure is an attempt to symbolize this point of view.



The curve of government control would show that government can exercise control over public enterprises as far as their expansion is within the range of government control. More expansion would mean the inability of government to exercise such control. When public enterprises operate in the area BCD, it is possible that they may overstress the financial profit side and fail to render less profitable but essential services. Hence public enterprises which are supposedly the organs of public administration would seem to represent what I prefer to call 'Piratical-Plenipotentiarism'.

It is difficult, however, to escape the impression that this has typically been the situation in Nigeria for quite a long time, not to say it still exists. Before 1967, there were four Development Corporations each of which had an average of thirty subsidiaries, in addition to the Federal Corporations and state-owned companies, making the total number up to over 250.[3] Apart from the difficulty of exercising governmental control over the operations of these bodies, such a huge number – and indeed the mere existence – of public enterprises poses many serious problems. In the following pages, the most important of these will be discussed.

Vagueness of Objectives

The most striking fact about the Nigerian public enterprises is that most of them have very dubious terms of reference. Their objectives are vague, unrealistically defined, and bear

[3]A. Adedeji, 'Formulating Administrative Reform Strategies in Africa', *The Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol 6, No 3, (April 1972) p 237.

little relation to the facts of the environment which they have to operate in, or to the needs of national development. In the Report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of 'Certain Statutory Corporations in Western Nigeria', one finds the following statement, in one way or another, in each of the six investigated cases: 'The powers of the Corporations are not well defined in the Law.'[4] The Western Region Housing Corporation, for example, was established in 1958, and in 1960 it was felt that the said Corporation should be invested with powers for industrial buildings. This vagueness of objectives often results in two fundamental problems. The first is that the Corporation may engage in some activities which are beyond its original purpose. While the Law did not state explicitly that the Western Nigeria Printing Corporation could be engaged in commercial matters, the Coker Commission found that the Corporation carried quite a substantial volume of commercial printing.[5] The second problem is that the Corporation may undertake activities with which neither its financial resources nor its staff efficiently can cope. In either cases it is likely that social welfare objectives, service to the community, and long-term infrastructural development will be given only low priority.

Moreover, the lack of clear objectives means that the performance of public enterprises would not be judged according to specific criteria, but more likely according to their ability to produce healthy balance sheets. When they make losses, they are, from the point of view of public opinion, automatically unsuccessful. This is not necessarily true because losses are sometimes the price the country has to pay for the services it provides in overall development. But, how can the public understand this fact without being informed about the objectives of the loss making bodies. And, in a logical consequence, is it possible to inform people about something which is unclear or unknown? In short, the vagueness of objectives is a matter which is not conducive to real economic development.[7]

Financial Irresponsibility

Because of the lack of clear grounds upon which public enterprises could be held accountable to parliament or its agents, they seldom operate as economically as they should.[8] Resources available are frequently used unwisely. In one of the Nigerian Corporations, it was found that all its resources (£68.6 million) had been completely used up in grants, loans and other expenditure to the extent that after eight years of its establishment, it had to exist on an overdraft amounting to over £2.5 million. The Commission also found that out of all these resources, a sum of £1.7 was the only investment

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[4] *Report of Coker Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Certain Statutory Corporations in Western Nigeria*, (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, Vol 1, 1962), p 19.

[5] *Ibid.*, p 16.

[6] *Loc. cit.*

[7] G. Glentworth, 'Public Enterprises in Developing Countries: Some Suggestions on Creation, Organization, and Control', *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol 12, No 3, (1973), p 192.

[8] J. J. Spengler, *op. cit.*, pp 229-230.

readily realizable; most of the rest could not be called in.[9] This financial irresponsibility appears to be the main reason why the exact nature and character of public enterprises is elusive. For such dramatic instances of irresponsibility brought restrictions which seriously limited the exercise of freedom these enterprises supposedly were allowed when created.[10] As a result, they have become bodies conforming to neither the civil service organization nor the pattern of private industry.[11]

CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT:

Corruption is a major characteristic of public enterprises in Nigeria as well as in many other developing countries. It stems largely out of the fact that there is no effective control over the affairs of public enterprises. The laws and regulations governing them are inadequate and are undervalued as a tool in achieving the right balance between control and freedom. The result is that most public enterprises become 'one-man' organizations, and the man is usually the chairman. The Coker Commission found that the Chairman of one of the investigated Corporations ran it as his own private business and had no regard whatsoever for Ministerial control over his actions.[12] It is often said that in Nigeria every government contract cost the country at least 10 per cent more than its should because of 'Dash'. This saying has wider application to public enterprises simply because the moral sanctions against corruption are weak; and sanctions are weak because political organizations – notably political parties, public opinion, parliament, interest groups – are weak.

Mismanagement, on the other hand, is a natural consequence of the situation where civil servants are appointed to top managerial positions in public enterprises due to the lack of experienced industrial and business managers. Most, if not all, of these civil servants do not have an entrepreneurial outlook and are unable to master the unfamiliar problems of costing, investment, price decisions, inventory control, labour-management relations, and the like. They, in a word, do not possess first-hand knowledge about business administration.[13]

CONCLUSION:

For all the aforementioned problems which public enterprises encounter, one must unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that these bodies, as far as Nigeria is concerned, have failed and have yet to fulfil their objectives, ill defined as these are. With the increase in the

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[9]*Comments of the Federal Goverment on the Report of Coker Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Certain Statutory Corporations in Western Nigeria*, (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, Sessional Paper No 4, 1962) pp 3-4.

[10]M. Fainsod, 'The Structure of Development Administration' in I. Swerdlow (ed.), *Development Administration: Concepts and Problems*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), pp 18-19.

[11]*Report of the Nigerian Railway Corporation of Tribunal of Inquiry*, (Lagos: Government Printer, 1967), pp 50-51.

[12]Report of Coker Commission . . . , *op. cit.*, Vol 2, p 28.

[13]M. Fainsod, *op. cit.*, p 18.

tempo of development, these problems assume greater urgency and demand far-reaching changes in procedures and approach. First of all, the enterprises' objectives and the criterion for a profit or loss making investment policy must be clearly defined. These objectives must be realistic and within the enterprises' available resources – financial and human. Second, the responsibilities, duties and accountability of each employee must be clearly set out without vagueness. Third, ambitious training programmes have to be launched to supply efficient managerial and technical skills. On-the-job training schemes and short- and long-term management training programmes must be designed with a view to maintaining high operational efficiency.

Quarterly Notes

BRITAIN – Town and Country Planning International School

The 1979 International Summer School was held at Langwith College, University of York from the 8th – 12th September. The theme for the school this year was 'Environmental Planning and Development Planning' and it was attended by some 75 participants, with colleagues from a diversity of Third World countries as well as representatives from British universities, consultancies and local government.

The participants were welcomed by Professor Moughton, chairman of the International Committee with Andrew Ligale from Kenya providing the opening address with his paper on 'Planning for Developing Countries in the 1980s'. The school was structured so as to provide papers, case studies and seminars. At the level of 'National Issues in Planning', Tan Sri Sendut presented a paper on Malaysia; with the case study on Nigeria's new federal capital, Abuja, presented by a member of the consultancy team. The second level was 'Local Planning' and here Professor Achwal's paper from India proved particularly illuminating; while the case study was on transportation in Libya. Tourism was a special topic with a film from Tunis and a discussion paper by Dr Romaya. A very wide diversity of seminars ranging from Planning Education through Migration Problems to Shelter after Disaster provided the opportunity for smaller group discussion with summaries presented at follow-up plenary sessions.

Participants were given plenty of opportunity for informal discussion while increasing their knowledge of the surrounding area with the organization of a Walk-around-York as well as study tours of the North York Moors and Near Earswick. The Open Session was ably chaired by Professor Johnson-Marshall with the final discussion panel examining the contribution of International and Bilateral Aid Agencies to Development in the field of Environmental Planning. This was led by Michael Safier kindly replacing Professor Koeningsberger whose absence from the proceedings, as a consequence of his recent accident, was sadly felt.

(specially contributed by Caroline O. N. Moser)

BRITAIN – Commonwealth New Towns Conference

East Kilbride, the first of the Scottish New Towns, achieved another first when, on Monday, 17th September, 1979, Lord Home opened the Commonwealth New Towns

Conference at the Civic Centre there. The Conference was the brain child of the East Kilbride Development Corporation which organized everything very efficiently. The Commonwealth Foundation strongly supported the Conference and the chairmanship was in the hands of Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, Chairman of the Foundation's Trustees. The participants, well over one hundred in number, came from all parts of the Commonwealth and beyond. The Conference itself lasted five days until the 21st, with papers, discussions and visits to other Scottish New Towns. For the more fortunate, visits and social occasions had begun on the 14th and had continued afterwards to the 23rd. One of the highlights was a full ceremonial retreat with the pipes of the Royal Scots Guards on the ramparts of Stirling Castle, underlining that the Conference was a most Scottish event.

The main purpose of the Conference was to tell the Commonwealth and others more about the British New Towns and to satisfy a demand for information. The papers presented explained the principles and progress of the New Towns. There was criticism as well as praise. Some speakers made quips about there being no new towns in the sense that all towns had at some time been new, but such quips were not unduly pursued because it was agreed that the British New Towns had readily distinguishing features. They had been progressively established under the legislation, beginning with Stevenage on 11th November, 1946. The date for east Kilbride was 6th May, 1947. They had specific powers in relation to finance and operations and to develop to meet population targets. The objects for establishing the New Towns may have varied somewhat to reflect geographical location needs, but all have common elements – decongestion of cities, industries, employment and the improvement of living standards. Some of the New Towns have reached maturity now and the process of handing over to normal local authorities has begun.

The New Towns have been a success story for Britain and have still a part to play. The Conference provided a base for the consideration of the lessons learnt and their relevance for other countries under vastly different conditions – where, in some cases, GDPs exceed those of Britain and where land is not in such short supply and the emphasis is on free enterprise, and, in others, where great poverty, high population growth, rapid urbanization and lack of resources prevailed. Towards the end of the Conference, more attention was given to appropriateness of the New Towns concept in developing countries. Participants from some of those countries expressed appreciation of how effective a responsible fully charged, unelected corporation could be, but, also, doubts, because conditions in their countries, particularly lack of resources militated against early devolution; they accepted that central governments, in some form or the other, would have to continue to play dominant parts. They saw, however, that the British New Towns example and experience were valuable and could be used in suitable cases moulded to meet the quite different basic conditions.

The Conference was a success because it went far in achieving what the promoters had in mind and because it brought together people from all parts of the Commonwealth for exposition and enthusiastic exchanges of opinions and knowledge.

(specially contributed)

Book Reviews

District Planning in India, SUDIPTO MUNDLE; *Indian Institute of Public Administration,* New Delhi 1977; 95pp incl. 4 appendices; 5 proformae and 10 displays (tables + diagrams); Rs 30, $8 or £5 00

Despite its small size (only a little over 20,000 words) and modest appearance *Mr Mundel's* book is important. The Director of the Indian Institute of Public Administration acknowledges this in his foreword when he speaks of district planning . . . (as) 'vital not only for the future of development planning in India but also for the future design of Indian administration' and welcomes Mr Mundle's study as a contribution to the debate on the spatial implementation of development plans.

This debate goes back to the Narielwala Committee Report* of 1959, to the attempts of building up a Community Development Administration in the early 1950s, to the proposals of resource based planning regions of the Town and Country Planning Organization of the early 1960s, to the growth pole and central place debate, to ideas of market town centred rural development regions in the later 1960s and the eventual return to the revenue district as the spatial unit for rural development planning. The account of these proposals is one of the many fascinating aspects of his history of Indian planning ideas that remains to be written.

Sudipto Mundle's book is not so much concerned with this history as with the situation in the 1970s and with possibilities of improving it. He addresses the subject as an economist and asks two main questions:

a is district level planning desirable in India and what specific form should it take?
b how is district planning done in practice and how could it be improved?

The first two chapters are devoted to the first, the remaining three to the second of these questions.

There is a good analysis of the transitional nature of the Indian agrarian economy and of the different stages which the various regions have reached in converting a predominantly pre-capitalist agriculture into a fully fledged capitalist system. The rationale for district planning within a system of multi-level planning is briefly established and the most important tasks in district planning are identified. This is followed by suggestions for 'Expanded District Social Accounts' and by a 'Programme Network for a Complete District Plan'.

*Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Townships Schemes prepared by *S. K. Dey*. . . . No RHC–8(2)/49 G.O.I. Min. of Rehab. New Delhi, September 22, 1949.

Chapter 3 contains a description and critical evaluation of the 'District Planning Guidelines' issued by the Planning Commission in September 1969 in the context of India's fourth Five Year Plan. This includes an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the traditional separation of revenue administration and law and order administration on the one hand from development administration on the other. Land reform and redistribution, for instance, are seen as legal matters and are therefore out of bounds for the development administration. They are not even mentioned in the Guidelines of the Planning Commission.

In the remaining two chapters, Sudipto Mundle looks at the 'reality of District Planning' at State and District levels, particularly at 'the relationships between field administration and the (state) secretariat'. He finds that, in practice, 'planning begins not at the district level but within each department at the state level', and that 'developing a genuinely integrated plan for the district where the district rather than the sector is the unit of planning is almost impossible under the circumstances'.

Summing up his criticism of the present system Mundle makes the following points:

1 Persistance of departmental initiative at state level stifles local initiative at district level;

2 There is little co-ordination between sectors or departments at state level and therefore even less in the district;

3 The concentration of decision-making powers at the state level discourages discussions with non-officials in the district;

4 There is in fact 'no genuinely integrated plan for the district';

5 Facilities and expertise for any genuine planning at the district level are almost non-existent.

A particularly serious criticism is levelled against the present system of agricultural planning: 'Target setting for agriculture remains on paper'. Indian agriculture consists almost entirely of private sector farms. The public sector cannot influence it through target setting. It should accept this reality and concentrate on influencing it through supportive programmes. In this context he demands also that ' . . . land redistribution and rural employment schemes must come into the domain of district planning, not only as social welfare tasks, but as crucial development tasks'.

Mundle is convinced that the present weaknesses of district planning can be overcome only by a reform of the whole administration at district *and* state level. He wisely refrains from offering a prescription for such a reform, but ventures some interesting pointers regarding the direction it would have to take:

Reform would have to begin in the state secretariats, not in the districts. The present *sectoral* (subject-) departments would have to be replaced by *district* departments. Each of these 'would then become a development authority for a district rather than an activity'. He is under no illusion about the likelihood of administrative reforms of such fundamental and far-reaching nature being carried through in the near future, but he is justifiably keen on opening up and/or keeping alive the discussion on this subject.

More likely to be realized in the foreseeable future are *Sudipto Mundle's* suggestion for a reform of the training of district level officers. Like the recommendations for administrative reform, these are given only in outline. In-service training is suggested as a tool to give district level officer the necessary competence in development planning and development management. Subject lists are given for possible courses of four to eight months with emphasis on project planning and project implementation.

This looks promising. Administrative reforms and the introduction of new subjects are not likely to suceed, unless those who are to operate the new methods are trained to do so and have begun to think in the new terms. If the proposed in-service training was not to remain limited to the district level, but was to be extended also to state level officers, the prospects for the proposed reforms would not look quite as hopeless as they appear at present.

O. H. KOENIGSBERGER

The Politics of Administration – the Malaysian Experience, MAVIS PUTHUCHEARY; *Oxford University Press;* pp 170; appendices, bibliography, Index; £15.25.

This is a succinct study by a Malaysian scholar and makes an impressive contribution to knowledge of Malaysian Government, with a viewpoint differing in some important respects from that of Professor Milton Esman's *Administration and Development in Malaysia* (Cornell, U P 1972). While based on work prepared and submitted as a thesis, Dr Puthucheary's book has a refreshing breadth of focus and straightforward presentation unusual for a work of this type. The thesis origin is reflected in the prominence of tables and the findings of a questionnaire, and the lengthy bibliography and extensive footnotes, the latter two providing a valuable resource to readers wishing to examine the subject in depth.

The book consists of ten short chapters, three summarizing the evolution of the civil service, emphasising its unusual character and political relationships, and the particular importance of the administrative class, conveniently described by its traditional abbreviation of MCS. Various aspects of the service are then examined – ethnic representation, socio-economic background, value orientations of civil servants, motivation and morale, and the ability of the service in its present structure to respond effectively to the responsiblity imposed by the New Economic Policy. In her conclusion, while rejecting the description of Malaysia as an 'administrative state', Puthucheary is deeply concerned with the present and future influence of 'a civil service which to a large extent is accountable only to itself'.

Despite impressive personal research, the findings on the whole confirm views already presented by others, notably J. C. Scott, and reflect misgivings quite widely expressed. The value of the study does not lie in its fundamental originality, but rather in its clarity of view, its drawing together of scattered but highly related material and its sustained critical analysis of the role and character of the MCS. The first two are particularly welcome to non-Malaysian readers, making readily comprehensible an unusual history, and the

relationships within government that arise directly from it. From this aspect the absence of laboured structural description is a distinct advantage. The third is highly controversial. Puthucheary emphasises the dominant and increasingly pervasive influence and control of the administrative class not only in the civil service but throughout the entire public sector. She traces and explains the predominantly Malay character of the class and its special association with the ruling party, the class and party having established a symbiotic relationship in which the potentially divergent interests of the party, the civil service and the public are obscured. Notwithstanding the achievements, and self confidence of the MCS, she charges it with having a divisive influence in the service taken as a whole, of professional inadequacy in its present developmental role, and increasing partiality in a situation where the balance of ethnic values require the greatest neutrality.

It is in these aspects that Puthucheary conflicts with the conclusion of Esman of the potential of the MCS to promote change and take an impartial role in conflict management. Esman had serious reservations of the capacity of the class, views also reflected in the DAU, Training Report – but such defects could predictably be reduced by training, and appropriate structures and procedures. Puthucheary sees the problem of Malaysian public administration as more intractable, requiring changes in the form and style of Malaysian politics before necessary changes in objectives, motivation and performance can be realised. Without such changes the implementation of current policy may well eradicate inequalities only to create others, and further risk a fragile national unity.

This view will not pass unchallenged. Some will dismiss it as the bias of a non-Malay, others as an exaggeration of genuine problems. Regrettable to the reviewer is the lack of case material presented to substantiate arguments. Such evidence could be more convincing than the questionnaire findings. However, such cases would have demanded a more detailed background, leading the author into an analysis of public administration outside her focus. Fortunately the book's credibility does not rest on its formal methodology, but equally – rather more so – on the shrewd perception of a writer experienced in the study of Malaysian government and politics, and personally acquainted with the politicans and civil servants of all ethnic groups with whom the book is primarily concerned.

M. NORRIS

The Worlds of Patrick Geddes, Dr PHILIP BOARDMAN; *Routledge and Kegan Paul;* index, notes, appendix; pp 528; £13.50.

To suggest that there is at present a 'Geddes Revival' would not be true, as this would imply that the Geddes cult had died. It is more accurate to say that there is a new surge of interest in Patrick Geddes and his works. Geddes enjoyed such occasions in his lifetime following his series of 'Cities Exhibitions' and when he was knighted. Later, he had universal public acknowledgement during the centenary of his birth in 1954. Whenever the planners, sociologists or economists are faced with a new problem, it is possible to go back to the teachings of Patrick Geddes and find a solution there. One current example of this is P. G.'s 'conservative surgery' or 'The rediscovery of P. G.'s house-by-house and block-by-block analyses by today's town planners, who in turn apply them to the preservative 'rehabilitation' of depressed urban areas . . .' P. G. was ahead of his time. There are

references to difficulties in following P. G.'s lectures by many of his contemporaries; yet as time goes on we begin to understand him better.

In the first publication on Patrick Geddes by Dr Boardman *L'Oeuvre educatrice de Patrick Geddes*, the author started by asking the question Who is Patrick Geddes?, and in the concluding chapter he referred to a quotation from an American newspaper headline during P. G.'s visit to America in 1923 where he was described as 'The Modern Leonardo'. He has also been described as a 'Jack of all trades' and 'A man who saw life whole'. People from a variety of disciplines and with diverse interests come across the name of P. G. and identify him with Biology, Sociology, Town Planning or some other discipline. The bibliography of Dr Boardman's 1936 work listed well over 300 publications by P. G. starting with his first discovery, the presence of chlorophyl in some animal life in 1878 and continuing till the 1930s with publications in a wide range of subjects.

P. G. was 'rich in distinguished friends, yet richer in a multitude of humble students'. His pupils included Abercrombie, Holford, Unwin and his 'dissident disciple' Lewis Mumford. He shared a platform with G. B. Shaw and H. G. Wells; he knew Ghandi and corresponded with Tagore. His application for the Chair of Botany at Edinburgh University was supported by no less a person than Darwin. This distinguished company and a host of other acquaintances such as Ruskin, Huxley and Kropotkin are a testimony to the great personality of P. G. and the age in which he lived. One also appreciates the dedication with which Dr Boardman has researched the life of P. G.

P. G. does not seem to have kept a regular diary, but he was a prolific correspondent and he often used to 'develop his thoughts on paper', leaving a wealth or a nightmare of paperwork for the researchers. Lewis Mumford, amongst others, was tempted to undertake the classification of some of these papers but it proved to be an impossible task. A considerable amount of material is still in Scotland. A 'Register of the papers of Professor Sir Patrick Geddes' has been produced by Strathclyde Department of Urban and Regional Planning. The bulk of the sociological papers is at Keel University, while Harvard and New York have a wealth of material. Yet, there have been reports in the Glasgow newspapers that some of P. G.'s papers had been burnt, while others were salvaged from the Corporation dump. When all of this is supplemented by oral, written and recorded material from the Geddes family and acquaintances, the biographer could be overwhelmed with information.

Philip Boardman first met P. G. during a short visit to France in 1925. Then he went for a year to the Scots College at Montpellier in 1929/30, a rather inauspicious year for the college, when Boardman faced P. G. as one of two spokesmen for the students during a student's revolt. Yet, Philip Boardman returned to Montpellier University and chose the work of Patrick Geddes as the subject of his doctoral thesis which he completed and published in 1936. He continued his research on Geddes afterwards; in 1944 he published his first Biography of P. G. which he now describes as the 'First systematic biography of P. G., but weakened by a semi-fictional chapter 4'. In his present work, Dr Boardman has used more recently published work as well as more personal research and material in Scotland in particular. His assessments and critical re-evaluations have been enriched by the documents from the centenary celebrations.

Dr Boardman has presented the successes as well as the failures of P. G. in a detached manner. The work comes to life in many of the quotable statements of P. G. who has been accused of being unable to express himself well – or was he just too far ahead of his time? Let us examine some P. G. statements:
On ecology . . . 'When any given environment or function, however apparently productive, is really fraught with disastrous influences to the organism, its modifications must be attempted, or, failing that, its abandonment faced'. On political conflict, his advice related to Cyprus, 'Solve the agricultural question and you have solved the Eastern Question'; and he referred to the balance sheet of society as 'coincidence of practical economics with practical ethics'. All these statements seem to strike a curiously modern note. He could also be a sharp and scathing critic; 'Lutyens' plans for Lucknow University (were) superextravagant monuments to himself in coldest refinement of Georgian architecture indifferent to Indian and European alike . . . '. P. G. was a theorist as seen in his 'Place-Work-Folk' diagram which he developed into the 'Notation, or Chart of Life'; while his passion for the 'Outlook Tower' described as 'the world's first sociological laboratory' reveals his analytical approach. Above all, P. G. was a practical man; he coined the word 'Geotechnics' and explained its implication; 'Geography is a descriptive science, it tells what is. Geotechnics is applied science, it shows what ought to be'. His planning commissions were diverse and included the entry which was awarded the Grand Prix at the Ghent Exhibition in 1913, a plan for Haifa for which he received £250 and the famous Indore reports (India).

P. G.'s work and ideas pose a dilemma for any biographer. Dr Boardman has covered most of the work, but it was not possible to deal with it in great depth. For example, one is told that 'Patrick Geddes in India "Pocket P. G." ought to be in the working kits of planners in every part of the world, not to forget administrators of rural and urban affairs'. Yet we are given only sketchy introductions to his work in India, and we look forward to the contribution of Dr Helen Meller in this area, to which the author refers. It is difficult to deal adequately with the life and work of P. G. in a single volume, yet Dr Boardman tends to digress in the final chapter when discussing the possible influences of P. G. on C. Doxiadis and Buckminster Fuller. It is true that P. G. appears to have had the dynamism of the former and could equal the marathon discourses of the latter, but the links referred to in the book seem tenuous and the influence is rather vague. At times, a number of quotations are repeated where the repetition was not necessary; this is hard to justify in such a lengthy volume made more difficult to read by the printing process used.

Dr Boardman gives us much of P. G.'s work but very little of the man himself. P. G. is presented as an austere eccentric who smoked half cigarettes and wore a corduroy suit for dinner. The biographer touches on his romantic letters and even speculates about P. G.'s sex life at the age of 70 on his second marriage, but gives no anecdotes of his life except for the occasion when he sent a telegram to Abercrombie at Liverpool asking him to come to the station bringing a pair of pyjamas and a five pound note. Among the 500 pages in the book, the reference to the student's revolt is the only item Dr Boardman includes of his personal contact with P. G.; one would expect more to enliven the text.

The second biography of Patrick Geddes by Dr Boardman is 'less fictional' than the first, with valuable additional research, but the style is occasionally reminiscent of a novel, or

rather an epic. The result is a story of many parts, each of which can be read independently. Yet, Dr Boardman has made a praiseworthy attempt to link the diverse and many-faceted aspects of the life of this extraordinary man, aptly described by the name of his publishing firm 'P. G. Unlimited'.

S. ROMAYA

African Proconsuls – European Governors in Africa, L. H. GANN and PETER DUIGNAN (Eds.); *The Free Press, New York & Hoover Institution, Stanford, California;* illustrated, maps, index; pp 548.

This magnum opus completes many years of hard and rewarding research on Africa carried out by Gann and Duignan, often it has seemed, waging a rather lonely battle to redress the balance weighed down by the fashionable prejudices expressed by most post-independence historiographers of Africa.

The African 'Guardians' has yet to be written. Here is a continental compôte instead. Each set of metropolitan Governors is introduced and there follows a small selection of individually written essays about particular Excellencies. This is all very ably done, but one must question whether it is the right approach; would it not have been better to have provided separate volumes of British and French Africa, with one volume dealing with Belgian, German and Portuguese governors?

As it is, the book, alas, lacks balance and inevitably continuity. Nor is like compared with like. The periods covered differ widely from Fairdherbe who retired from Algeria in 1870 before any of the other proconsuls were over twenty-one years old, to Andrew Cohen who was born long after Fairdherbe's retirement.

One is glad to find Brian Weinstein writing on the great French Guaianian Eboué with charm, sympathy and insight. But the volume is supposed to be about Africa and most of his short essay inevitably deals with the Caribbean.

Britain is introduced by Tony Kirk-Greene. He is admirably qualified to write on any one of many British governors and it is a pity that his contribution is limited to an often disappointing overview with far too much trivia on private secretaries and ADCs – the former, good, bad and indifferent like any other cadre – a useful stepping-stone for those who were keen on rapid ladder climbing: ADCs mostly incompetent and at sea outside GH, best in the role of head steward – that at most is all that needs to be said.

The outstanding contribution comes from the felicitous pen of Ronald Robinson writing on Andrew Cohen – a brilliant vignette – but Cohen was not really proconsul at all. He was an outstanding Whitehall mandarin who undertook one gubernatorial tour in Uganda when colonial office promotion was temporarily blocked for him. As one who was a guest at Cohen's Entebbe GH, this reviewer can endorse the remarkable informality there. How delighted Cohen must have been when he read MacMillan's 'Winds of Change' speech. As

Ronald Robinson makes clear Cohen was himself the great initiator of change in British Africa, and how much the Third World in general and ODM/ODA in particular have missed him since his sudden and premature death while still in office. In contrast, we are given a long account of that sturdy administrator Sir Robert Coryndon's life in Africa. There is a lot of special pleading here. Coryndon, who was a strong character, dealt toughly with the opposition he met until he found himself rather out of his depth in Kenya and his previously distinguished career came to a rather inglorious end – sadly with his death.

Concentrating as it does on the role of the Chief Executive in a Dependency, too little is made of the opportunity to assess how far a particular governor stimulated enthusiasm and constructive action by his subordinates – surely the hallmark of of a really good proconsul. A positive staff response could complement a governor's initiative, and while good staff could sustain a weak governor and poor staff weaken a good one, a service's morale, efficiency and repute depended greatly on his personality, like indeed that of any major school.

The outstanding governors in East Africa were without doubt, Cameron, Twining and Turnbull. Dundas and Mitchell both had remarkable careers yet not one of these five has been selected for a pen picture. Indeed, one wonders how the selection came to be made, both in quality and in numbers – six from France, four from Britain, and two each from Portugal, Belgium and Germany. Had Ronald Wraith contributed on Guggisberg, the quality of the section on West Africa would have been greatly enhanced. But neither Guggisberg nor Burns were selected. Sir John Macpherson, the career governor who became Permanent Secretary and a very able administrator, sent his son to Tanganyika around 1956 and with subsequent transfer to Hong Kong he achieved long-term service. The knee-patting anecdote however, sounds improbable.

At least one strange error has crept into the text, Richard Turnbull *not* Evelyn Baring used to climb the Pugu hills and cycle round Dar es Salaam early in the morning. Sir Edward Twining was known as 'Peter' to his family – who on earth ever called him 'Twinks'?

PETER JOHNSTON

Sanitation in Developing Countries, ARNOLD PACEY (Ed.); *John Wiley & Sons, 1978;* preliminaries, illustrations, tables, index; pp 238; £9.75.

In July 1977 OXFAM assembled fifty people who specialize in sanitation in developing countries to contribute to a five-day Conference at Pembroke College, Oxford. The Conference was organized jointly by Oxfam and the Ross Institute and it was appropriate that the largest number of authors came from Asia, with Africa close behind. The papers dealt with a variety of topics, ranging from detailed accounts of improved pit latrines for particular African communities to a broad-brush review of social factors in sanitation programmes. There was fairly limited discussion of the papers, but participants divided into working groups to consider various types of low-cost sanitation.

In this book Arnold Pacey has edited the report of the Conference with very great skill. Some papers are included in their original form, and others are summarized, but the whole

book flows smoothly in spite if its diverse origin. It begins with a chapter 'defining the problem', in which data are given on the present situation in the Third World. In some rural areas of Ghana there are more than a thousand people per latrine! Health aspects are then considered, with emphasis on worm infections.

The next chapter deals with the choice of technology and includes accounts of the position in mid-1977 of the World Bank research project on appropriate technology for sanitation and the bibliographical investigation carried out by IDRC at Ottowa.

The book then goes on to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the Western solution – conventional water-carried sewerage. Sewerage is out of the question for most of the population in developing countries, so the greater part of the remainder of the book deals with various forms of unsewered sanitation – aqua privies, pit latrines, composting latrines and the conservancy system. There are descriptions of some especially difficult problems and their solutions, including the Oxfam sanitation units in Bangladesh refugee camps and the sanitation component of the bustee improvement programmes of the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority. To complete the technological picture there are a couple of chapters on the use of excreta and wastewater for biogas production, fertilizer and irrigation.

Only one chapter deals specifically with the social factor, although interaction between people and sanitation is mentioned throughout the book. As Arnold Pacey writes in the brief but excellent concluding chapter, the emphasis on technology is partly due to the timing of the Conference in the mid-seventies. Guy Stringer of Oxfam and David Bradley of the Ross Institute write in the Foreword that this book is an interim statement in a changing situation. Many of the papers show developing thoughts and concepts and incomplete data.

The upsurge of interest in low-cost sanitation is itself remarkable. It follows a change of emphasis in the provision of water supply. At the beginning of this decade the aim in the provision of water and sanitation was agreed by the World Health Organization and international consulting engineers. Water made safe in a treatment works should be provided to every household and the waste water, including excreta, should be conveyed in sewers to another treatment works and then discharged to a river or other body of water. The publication in 1972 of White, Bradley and White's *Drawers of Water* was a major factor in changed attitudes to water. Their main thesis was that with limited resources access to an adequate quantity of water for a large number of people is better than providing high-quality water to a few. At that time the World Bank and other providers of capital were only interested in a water project if it could be shown that there would be an economic return, for example by industrial use of water. Now the Bank is leading the way and supports low-cost water supply projects. It also insists on improvement to the majority's unsewered sanitation as a condition for providing funds for the minority's sewerage. Governments of some poor developing countries for taking similar action.

This change of emphasis is difficult for engineers and administrators trained and accustomed to think that sewerage is the only satisfactory form of sanitation. Around the world hundreds of university engineering and medical departments deal with the principles

and practice of sewage treatment (or 'water reclamation' to give it the current euphemism). Yet sewage treatment only affects 3% of the population of developing countries. Only a handful of centres consider unsewered sanitation to be important: the Ross Institute is one: the WEDC Group at Loughborough University of Technology is another.

Sanitation in Developing Countries describes the technolgical alternatives. The problem in the 1980s – the United Nations Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade – is to apply the known technology. Well over a thousand million people in developing countries are without satisfactory sanitation of any kind. The selection of the most appropriate sanitation requires consideration of acceptability, available resources, disease patterns, maintenance and administration, as well as technology. Oxfam, the Ross Institute, Loughborough's WEDC Group the World Bank are aware of this. They and others are continually looking at the interaction between the parameters which determine what is most appropriate in different situations.

The Oxford Conference was important. It was the first major international conference to concentrate on low-cost sanitation. Many of those who attended are in the forefront of the international effort to provide some kind of satisfactory sanitation for everyone in the world. It is good that Oxfam chose Arnold Pacey to report the Conference because he has provided a most valuable book. It is valuable not only for engineers and health personnel, but also for administrators, planners and others directly or indirectly concerned with sanitation in developing countries.

JOHN PICKFORD

Urbanization and rural development: a spatial policy for equitable growth, DENNIS A. RONDINELLI and KENNETH RUDDLE; *Praeger, New York,* 1978; bibliography, notes, index; pp 221; £15.00.

Urban development and regional planning are disciplines that have long been up for grabs. They provide a forum where geographers, town planners, defrocked architects, economists and social anthropologists mingle unselfconsciously. The term 'planner' provides them with a badge and a form of greeting.

'Space' features heavily in the planners' stock in trade. But 'Spatial Planning' owes nothing to NASA: 'Balanced Spatial Systems' are a world away from Einstein, and even Patrick Moore might hiccup over 'Spatial Centres'. 'Spatial' as used by Rondinelli and Ruddle, means nothing more or less than 'geographical'. 'Spatial Policy', the subject of the book, appears to mean taking account of geographical location in framing development policies and being aware of the relationships between activities in different geographical settings, such as town and country.

The message is that development policies need to cope with the geographical dimension in tackling the problems of poverty. Readers who are not put off by the high-flown jargon of the Chapter and Section headings (example, 'Transformational Development: An approach to Spatial Integration Strategy') will find it sensible, if banal, discussion of what must, by now, be *idées reçues* in this area.

Consider the following criticism of international aid agencies: 'That all aspects of the spatial structure – urban centres of every size and the rural hinterlands surrounding them – are crucial for creating integrated systems of production and exchange, seems to have been barely recognized in the past operations of development assistance agencies' (p 196). It is a little difficult to perceive the argument through the mist of jargon, but when that is done the point is commonplace, and as a criticism it falls flat. Too much of this well-meaning, well-researched and unexceptional book is of this kind.

Or consider the following distillation of the lessons of rural development! ' . . . if integrated rural development strategies are to succeed international aid must be deliberately focussed on those technical inputs and local support components that can effectively increase agricultural productivity, distribute income and wealth more evenly, and build the spatial structure in developing nations' (p 156). This is a pretty earth-bound conclusion for a book concerned with Space. Hardly a Giant Step for Mankind!

J. T. WINPENNY

The Changing Pacific: Essays in honour of H. E. Maude, NIEL GUNSON (Ed.); *Oxford University Press*, 1978; pp 351; £19.25.

The Changing Pacific is a collection of specialist essays – unusual in that they have been written by Academics, prominent in their own fields, in honour of a former Colonial Service Officer. Henry Evans Maude, now past seventy, spent nineteen years of his life in the service of the Western Pacific High Commission. Essentially a 'small islander', he was mainly concerned with the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and their off-liers but his career included spells in the Kingdom of Tonga and on Pitcairn Island. After a seven year stint with the South Pacific Commission he joined the Research School of Pacific Studies at the newly established Australian National University in Canberra. In its sympathetic atmosphere he achieved the by no means easy change from administrator to academic, becoming in due course a Professorial Fellow. His influence on Pacific studies has been a considerable one, as this book indicates. Of the twenty-six contributors (and these were not all who wished to participate) some fifteen hold professorial appointments.

The geographical range of the work is wide; all three of the recognized divisions of the Pacific – Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia – are featured and the very diversity provides something for everyone. From indigenous navigation (always a fascinating subject) the text shifts to social organization and kinship in the Gilberts where the Maude reputation was built up. Then there are a number of case studies culled from scattered Polynesian groups – including a strange farewell ceremony in Niue (Cook's Savage Island), the settlement of a dispute by traditional methods in Western Samoa and a detailed account of the funeral of the late Queen Salote. Nor is it only the smaller groups that are the focus of attention. There is a noteworthy paper on the 'moving frontier' resulting from Australian penetration of the New Guinea interior. H. E. Maude's own classic survey of beachcombers and castaways is reflected in an essay on their role in the Carolines. There are two contributions on health aspects of culture contact, one concerning the disastrous

introduction of measles to Aneityum in the New Hebrides and the other on missionary medicine in pre-Christian Tonga. The book concludes with what was probably the first indigenous participation in a study of Pacific island history, that of Hawaii.

The editor has explained that it was decided to limit invitations to the scholars here represented and working in the associated fields of Pacific history, anthropology and pre-history. It is therefore not surprising that parts should have a somewhat esoteric flavour. For the reader interested in Pacific administration, however, the book would have benefitted from the inclusion of up-to-date material on some current issues. I can think of two.

Over-population has always been and will continue to be in the foreseeable future a threat to the welfare of the small island communities. During the Thirties the Phoenix Islands Settlement Scheme was launched to relieve pressure in the Gilberts and this is touched on in the biographical sketch at the beginning of the book. There is no mention, however, of the fact that these colonies on the Phoenix Islands had subsequently to be abandoned and the Gilbertese settlers moved a second time, on this occasion to the Solomons. The background to the second move and how the settlers are faring in so different an environment would have made an interesting study and a useful addition to a work in honour of the proponent of the original scheme.

I confess to a feeling of disappointment that the only reference to the Banabans' now famous legal action is in a scholarly but rather difficult article on understanding oceanic kinship. Professor Maude is the acknowledged authority on the Banabans and their customs. It would have been compliment to him to have included a dispassionate survey of this *cause celèbre* – particularly as the Banabans, through their residence on an island in Fiji, are now involving that country as well as the Gilberts in their on-going territorial problems.

These points notwithstanding, the book remains a fitting tribute to a much respected figure in the field of Pacific history.

A. C. REID

Book Notes

Seasonal Dimensions to Rural Poverty: Analysis and Political Implications, 1979, ROBERT CHAMBERS, RICHARD LONGHURST, DAVID BRADLEY and RICHARD FEACHEM; *Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex; pp 28.*

This ably condensed short monograph is based on a conference held at IDS in 1978 which examined the seasonal factors which are adverse to rural communities, with particular emphasis on the sickness and malnutrition problems which invariably arise when famine occurs.

The Conference covered East and West Africa, India and Bangladesh. This means an unavoidably wide use of generalizations in a report as short as this one. Reference to selling or mortgaging land, selling jewels, etc has scant relevance at least in East Africa.
That the rainy season, for a number of reasons which are set out, proves the period of greatest stress and difficulty is no doubt true, but the report does not appear to examine the longer-term effects of famine, whether dry season or wet, the longer the famine continues, the worse of course do conditions get, the less able are small children who have been weaned, but are not strong enough to compete with their elders, to forage on their own for survival, and the growing debilitation which makes it even less probable that children will survive attacks of malaria, or any commonly infectious diseases. Nor does there seem to be mention of the danger period in the early colder dry season when bronchitis is often the killer in particular of those weakened by malnutrition.

ODI Review No 1 of 1979, *Overseas Development Institute, London;* published twice yearly at £6.00 (single copies £3.20).

This important Journal of development policy includes in the first number of 1979 Roy Jenkins' inaugural ODI Annual lecture in which he divides the nations of the Third World into three principal categories: OPEC countries (eg Kuwait, Saudi Arabia); the newly industrializing countries (eg Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Brazil), these two groups he calls the 'haves'; then come the 'have nots' (which themselves could readily subdivide into 'poor' and 'very poor'). He concludes with three 'guiding principles' which on examination, unfortunately, indicate no more than the general need to remove uncertainties which are not very clearly spelled out.

Other articles focus on agricultural planning, market access, and Zimbabwe. There is an admirable book review section.

Perceptions of Development, SANDRA WALLMAN (Ed); *Cambridge University Press;* index, pp 210; £8.75.

Skilfully edited by Sandra Wallman, this volume of essays by anthropologists/sociologists from Canada (with one apiece from Britain, the Netherlands and the USA), looks at some of the facets of development and the views on what development means to selected groups of Third World people – at least as interpreted by these professionals. The Editor points out how most of us either enumerate what has been gained by development or moan nostalgically for the past; there are interesting vignettes from Olowo Village in the Yoruba country of Nigeria where communalism prospered but prosperity decayed with private enterprise; from Eagle Bay in North-Central Canada where an Indian community provides a success story; and from the relatively well-off Bakoji of Ghana.

These mini-micro-studies make interesting reading. The contributors probably read rather too much into them and this makes it easy to be unduly naive and sometimes banal.

Nonetheless the editor has achieved no mean feat in melling as she has a very diverse collection which many anthropologists and sociologists round the world should enjoy.

Auxiliaries in Primary Health Care, KATHERINE ELLIOTT (Ed.); *Intermediate Technology Publications;* pp 126; £2.95.

This small booklet is in the form of an annotated bibliography listing global publications relating to the work of medical auxiliaries.
Section 1 deals with the training and education of auxiliaries, Section 2 with Auxiliaries and Community Health and Development.
There follows both a Geographical and a subject index, a list of useful addresses, a list of relevant journals and a list of publishers referred to in the bibliography.
This sensible, clearly written and admirably constructed bibliography should prove of great assistance to medical/health authorities throughout the Third World and to Agencies and others in donor and recipient countries alike, who are concerned in this important field.

Broadcasting in Guyana, RON SANDERS; *Routledge and Kegan Paul;* appendices and bibliography; pp 77; £3.95 (paperback).

The author has exceptional knowledge and experience of the news media in the Caribbean and in Guyana in particular. He was personally concerned in the development of the Guyanese radio service, with its two stations, one state-owned and one privately-owned and both dependent on advertising for their revenue. With foreign exchange problems causing the government to restrict imports, advertising formerly flourishing, markedly declined. This may simplify the task of nationalising the Demarara radio station which the author advocates albeit opposed to government control. With television to be added to the radio service there must be doubt whether the government of the day will be high minded enough to keep these media free from political control. Ron Sanders sets out what every democrat believes is the ideal way of operating a mass media system – but, alas, in this wicked world, is this not crying for the moon?

The Statesman's Year-Book 1979-80, JOHN PAXTON (Ed.); *The Macmillan Press,* Maps, tables, index; pp 1700; £10.95

Probably no other publication provides such a wealth of global knowledge – all for less than a £11. The latest edition of the Statesman's Year-Book follows the improved format introduced last year and a number of test checks show how extensive has been the annual revision. This year's maps demonstrate (a) World literacy (b) the linguistic provinces of the Iberian Peninsula.
The Year-Book remains an 'indispensable reference source for those concerned with international business of Government Affairs'.

Algeria 1960; PIERRE BOURDIEU (translated by RICHARD NICE); *Cambridge University Press;* index; pp 158; £7.95.

Professor Bourdieu's three inter-connecting essays comrprising this volume have been admirably translated from the French, and provide a pleasing scholarly vignette of the Kabyle of Algeria.
The author is a philosophising anthropologist who clearly has studied with care and most perceptively an Algerian way of life. He provides a fund of apposite sayings and quotations, in particular on the subordinate role of women in the World of Islam. 'your tomb is your house', she is told; at home the husband will call her 'by a gesture, or by a grunt' . . .
This is a book for quiet enjoyment – particularly by Arabists, sociologists and anthropologists.

Perpetua and the Habit of Unhappiness, MONGO BETI; pp 219; £1.45; (Translated from the French by John Reed and Clive Wake).

The Slave, ELECHI AMADI; pp 160; 95p

The House of Hunger, DARIBUDZO MARECHERA; pp 154; £1.25; published by *Heinemann* in the African writers series – paperbacks.

These three novels by modern African writers have one harsh common factor – Unhappiness. Perpetua and Slave are well and movingly written; The House of Hunger carries its harshness to the verge of surrealism. Each has a haunting flavour and if the reader is made to feel uncomfortable at, say, the male Chauvinism instanced particularly in Perpetua and The Slave, this is surely intended by the authors who portray truly, no doubt, the domestic scene in all too many a West African and Zimbabwe household.

Beyond the River Bend; HEINRICH GORTZ; *Cassell, London,* 1979; illustrated; pp 159; £4.99.

This small book provides the personal account of a Swiss trader/hunter during a dozen years in West Africa after the Second World War – mostly about days in the bush, many of them on hunting expeditions and mostly in Nigeria. The author's modest black and white drawings are of a better standard than his writing, but old West Africa hands will find their nostalgia aroused by his tales of voodoo, shooting, snakes and jungle.

Land, Law and registration, S. R. SIMPSON; *Cambridge University Press,* 1976, was reviewed in Volume XVI, Number 1 of this Journal. Readers will be interested to know that the Cambridge University Press has now published a paperback edition of this work (less Book 2, which contains three statutes and a legal commentary) at the much reduced price of £7.50.

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